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Abstract
The problem of reliably certifying the outcome of a computation performed by a quantum device
is rapidly gaining relevance. We present two protocols for a classical verifier to verifiably delegate a
quantum computation to two non-communicating but entangled quantum provers. Our protocols have
near-optimal complexity in terms of the total resources employed by the verifier and the honest provers,
with the total number of operations of each party, including the number of entangled pairs of qubits
required of the honest provers, scaling as O(g log g) for delegating a circuit of size g. This is in contrast
to previous protocols, whose overhead in terms of resources employed, while polynomial, is far beyond
what is feasible in practice. Our first protocol requires a number of rounds that is linear in the depth of
the circuit being delegated, and is blind, meaning neither prover can learn the circuit or its input. The
second protocol is not blind, but requires only a constant number of rounds of interaction.
Our main technical innovation is an efficient rigidity theorem that allows a verifier to test that two
entangled provers perform measurements specified by an arbitrary m-qubit tensor product of single-
qubit Clifford observables on their respective halves of m shared EPR pairs, with a robustness that is
independent of m. Our two-prover classical-verifier delegation protocols are obtained by combining this
rigidity theoremwith a single-prover quantum-verifier protocol for the verifiable delegation of a quantum
computation, introduced by Broadbent (Theory of Computing, 2018).
1 Introduction
Quantum computers hold the potential to speed up a wide range of computational tasks (see, for example,
[Mon16]). Recent progress towards implementing limited quantum devices has added urgency to the already
important question of how a classical verifier can test a quantum device. This verifier could be an experi-
mentalist running a new experimental setup; a consumer who has purchased a purported quantum device; or
a client who wishes to delegate some task to a quantum server. In all cases, the user would like to exert some
form of control over the quantum device. For example, the experimentalist may think that she is testing
that a particular experiment prepares a certain quantum state by performing a series of measurements, i.e.
by state tomography, but this assumes some level of trust in the measurement apparatus being used. For a
classical party to truly test a quantum system, that system should be modeled in a device-independent way,
having classical inputs (e.g. measurement settings) and classical outputs (e.g. measurement results).
Tests of quantum mechanical properties of a system first appeared in the form of Bell tests [Bel64,
CHSH69]. In a Bell test, a verifier asks classical questions to a quantum-device and receives classical
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answers. These tests make one crucial assumption on the system to be tested: that it consists of two spatially
isolated components that are unable to communicate throughout the experiment. One can then upper bound
the value of some statistical quantity of interest subject to the constraint that the two devices do not share
any entanglement. Such a bound is referred to as a Bell inequality. While the violation of a Bell inequality
can be seen as a certificate of entanglement, the area of self-testing, first introduced in [MY04], allows for
the certification of much stronger statements, including which measurements are being performed, and on
which state. Informally, a robust rigidity theorem is a statement about which kind of apparatus, quantum
state and measurements, must be used by a pair of isolated devices in order to succeed in a given statistical
test. Following a well-established tradition, we will refer to such tests as games, call the devices players
(or provers), and the quantum state and measurements that they implement the strategy of the players. A
rigidity theorem is a statement about the necessary structure of near-optimal strategies for a game.
In 2012, Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani proved a robust rigidity theorem for playing a sequence of n
CHSH games [RUV13]. Aside from its intrinsic interest, this rigidity theorem had two important conse-
quences. One was the first device-independent protocol for quantum key distribution. The second was a
protocol whereby a completely classical verifier can test a universal quantum computer consisting of two
non-communicating devices. The resulting protocol for delegating quantum computations has received a lot
of attention as the first classical-verifier delegation protocol. The task is well-motivated: for the foreseeable
future, making use of a quantum computer will likely require delegating the computation to a potentially
untrusted cloud service, such as that provided by IBM [Cas17].
Unfortunately, the complexity overhead of the delegation protocol from [RUV13], in terms of both the
number of EPR pairs needed for the provers and the overall time complexity of the provers as well as the
(classical) verifier, while polynomial, is prohibitively large. Although the authors of [RUV13] do not provide
an explicit value for the exponent, in [HPDF15] it is estimated that their protocol requires resources that scale
like Ω(g8192), where g is the number of gates in the delegated circuit (notwithstanding the implicit constant,
this already makes the approach thoroughly impractical for even a 2-gate circuit!). The large overhead is
in part due to a very small (although still inverse polynomial) gap between the completeness and soundness
parameters of the rigidity theorem; this requires the verifier to perform many more Bell tests than the actual
number of EPR pairs needed to implement the computation, which would scale linearly with the circuit size.
Subsequent work has presented significantly more efficient protocols for achieving the same, or simi-
lar, functionality [McK16, GKW15, HPDF15]. We refer to Table 1 for a summary of our estimated lower
bounds on the complexity of each of these results (not all papers provide explicit bounds, in which case
our estimates, although generally conservative, should be taken with caution). Prior to our work, the best
two-prover delegation protocol required resources scaling like g2048 for delegating a g-gate circuit. Things
improve significantly if we allow for more than two provers, however, the most efficient multi-prover dele-
gation protocols still required resources that scale as at least Ω(g4 log g) for delegating a g-gate circuit on
n qubits. Since we expect that in the foreseeable future most quantum computations will be delegated to a
third-party server, even such small polynomial overhead is unacceptable, as it already negates the quantum
advantage for a number of problems, such as quantum search.
The most efficient classical-verifier delegation protocols known [FH15, NV17], with poly(n) and 7
provers, respectively, require resources that scale as O(g3), but this efficiency comes at the cost of a tech-
nique of “post-hoc” verification. In this technique, the provers must learn the verifier’s input even before
they are separated, so that they can prepare the history state for the computation.1 As a result, these pro-
1Using results of Ji [Ji16], this allows the protocol to be single-round. Alternatively, the state can be created by a single prover
and teleported to the others with the help of the verifier, resulting in a two-round protocol.
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Provers Rounds Total Resources Blind
RUV 2012 [RUV13] 2 poly(n) ≥ g8192 yes
McKague 2013 [McK16] poly(n) poly(n) ≥ 2153g22 yes
GKW 2015 [GKW15] 2 poly(n) ≥ g2048 yes
HDF 2015 [HPDF15] poly(n) poly(n) Θ(g4 log g) yes
Verifier-on-a-Leash Protocol (Section 4) 2 O(depth) Θ(g log g) yes
Dog-Walker Protocol (Section 5) 2 O(1) Θ(g log g) no
Table 1: Resource requirements of various delegation protocols in the multi-prover model. We use n to
denote the number of qubits and g the number of gates in the delegated circuit. “depth” refers to the depth
of the delegated circuit. “Total Resources” refers to the gate complexity of the provers, the number of EPR
pairs of entanglement needed, and the number of bits of communication in the protocol. To ensure fair
comparison, each protocol is required to produce the correct answer with probability 99%. For all protocols
except our two new protocols, this requires a polynomial number of sequential repetitions, which is taken
into account when computing the total resources.
tocols are not blind2. Moreover, while the method does provide a means for verifying the outcome of an
arbitrary quantum computation, in contrast to [RUV13] it does not provide a means for the verifier to test
the provers’ implementation of the required circuit on a gate-by-gate basis. Other works, such as [HH16],
achieve two-prover verifiable delegation with complexity that scales like O(g4 log g), but in much weaker
models; for example, in [HH16] the provers’ private system is assumed a priori to be in tensor product form,
with well-defined registers. General techniques are available to remove the strong assumption, but they
would lead to similar large overhead as previous results.
In contrast, in the setting where the verifier is allowed to have some limited quantum power, such as
the ability to generate single-qubit states and measure them with observables from a small finite set, effi-
cient schemes for blind verifiable delegation do exist [ABE10, FK17, Mor14, Bro18, HM15, MF16, FH17,
MTH17] (see also [Fit17] for a recent survey). In this case, only a single prover is needed, and the most
efficient single-prover quantum-verifier protocols can evaluate a quantum circuit with g gates in time O(g).
The main reason these protocols are much more efficient than the classical-verifier multi-prover protocols is
that they avoid the need for directly testing any of the qubits used by the prover, instead requiring the trusted
verifier to directly either prepare or measure the qubits used for the computation.
Recently, another model has been considered where the classical verifier delegates her quantum compu-
tation to a single quantum prover [Mah18b, GV19]. The protocols proposed in this setting are computation-
ally secure, i.e. the security of the protocol rests on the assumption that the prover cannot solve an (expected
to be) hard problem for quantum computers (specifically, the Learning with Errors problem).
New rigidity results. We overcome the efficiency limitations of multi-prover delegation protocols by in-
troducing a new robust rigidity theorem. Our theorem allows a classical verifier to certify that two non-
communicating provers apply a measurement associated with an arbitrary m-qubit tensor product of single-
qubit Clifford observables on their respective halves of m shared EPR pairs. This is the first result to achieve
self-testing for such a large class of measurements. The majority of previous works in self-testing have
2 Blindness is a property of delegation protocols, which informally states that the prover learns nothing about the verifier’s
private circuit.
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been primarily concerned with certifying the state and were limited to simple single-qubit measurements
in the X-Z plane. Prior self-testing results for multi-qubit measurements only allow one to test for tensor
products of σX and σZ observables. While this is sufficient for verification in the post-hoc model of [FH15],
testing for σX and σZ observables does not directly allow for the verification of a general computation (un-
less one relies on techniques such as process tomography [RUV13], which introduce substantial additional
overhead).
Our first contribution is to extend the “Pauli braiding test” of [NV17], which allows one to test tensor
products of σX and σZ observables with constant robustness, to allow for σY observables as well. This is
somewhat subtle due to an ambiguity in the complex phase that cannot be detected by any classical two-
player test; we formalize the ambiguity and show how it can be effectively accounted for. Our second
contribution is to substantially increase the set of elementary gates that can be tested, to include arbitrary
m-qubit tensor products of single-qubit Clifford observables. This is achieved by introducing a new “con-
jugation test”, which tests how an observable applied by the provers acts on the Pauli group. The test is
inspired by general results of Slofstra [Slo16], but is substantially more direct.
A key feature of our rigidity results is that their robustness scales independently of the number of EPR
pairs tested, as in [NV17]. This is crucial for the efficiency of our delegation protocols. The robustness for
previous results in parallel self-testing typically had a polynomial dependence on the number of EPR pairs
tested. We give an informal statement of our robust rigidity theorem.
Theorem 1 (Informal). Let m ∈ Z>0. Let G be a fixed, finite set of single-qubit Clifford observables. Then
there exists an efficient two-prover test RIGID(G, m) with O(m)-bit questions (a constant fraction of which
are of the form W ∈ Gm) and answers such that the following properties hold:
• (Completeness) There is a strategy for the provers that uses m + 1 EPR pairs and succeeds with
probability at least 1− e−Ω(m) in the test.
• (Soundness) For any ε > 0, any strategy for the provers that succeeds with probability 1− ε in the test
must be poly(ε)-close, up to local isometries, to a strategy in which the provers begin with (m + 1)
EPR pairs and is such that upon receipt of a question of the form W ∈ Gm the prover measures the
“correct” observable W.
Although we do not strive to obtain the best dependence on ε, we believe it should be possible to obtain
a scaling of the form C
√
ε for a reasonable constant C. We discuss the test in Section 3.
New delegation protocols. We employ the new rigidity theorem to obtain two new efficient two-prover
classical-verifier protocols in which the complexity of verifiably delegating a g-gate quantum circuit solving
a BQP problem scales as O(g log g).3
We achieve our protocols by adapting the efficient single-prover quantum-verifier delegation protocol
introduced by Broadbent [Bro18] (we refer to this as the “EPR protocol”), which has the advantage of
offering a direct implementation of the delegated circuit, in the circuit model of computation and with very
little modification needed to ensure verifiability, as well as an elegantly simple and intuitive analysis.
Our first protocol is blind, and requires a number of rounds of interaction that scales linearly with the
depth of the circuit being delegated. The second protocol is not blind, but only requires a constant number
of rounds of interaction with the provers. Our work is the first to propose verifiable two-prover delegation
protocols that overcome the prohibitively large resource requirements of all previous multi-prover protocols,
3The log g overhead is due to the complexity of sampling from the right distribution in rigidity tests. We leave the possibility
of removing this by derandomization for future work. Another source of overhead is in achieving blindness: in order to hide the
circuit, we encode it as part of the input to a universal circuit, introducing a factor of O(log g) overhead.
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requiring only a quasilinear amount of resources, in terms of number of EPR pairs and time. However,
notwithstanding our improvements, a physical implementation of verifiable delegation protocols remains a
challenging task for the available technology.
We introduce the protocols in more detail. The protocols provide different methods to delegate the
quantum computation performed by the quantum verifier from [Bro18] to a second prover (call him PV for
Prover V). The rigidity test is used to verify that the second prover indeed performs the same actions as
the honest verifier, which are sequences of single-qubit measurements of Clifford observables from the set
Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G} (where F and G are defined in (2)).
In the first protocol, one of the provers plays the role of Broadbent’s prover (call him PP for Prover
P), and the other plays the role of Broadbent’s verifier (PV). As PV just performs single-qubit and Bell-
basis measurements, universal quantum computational power is not needed for this prover. The protocol is
divided into two sub-games; which game is played is chosen by the verifier by flipping a biased coin with
appropriately chosen probabilities.
• The first game is a sequential version of the rigidity game RIGID(Σ, m) (from Theorem 1) described
in Figure 14. This aims to enforce that PV performs precisely the right measurements;
• The second game is the delegation game, described in Figures 11, 12, and 13, and whose structure is
summarized in Figure 9. Here the verifier guides PP through the computation in a similar way as in
the EPR Protocol.
We remark that in both sub-games, the questions received by PV are of the form W ∈ Σm, where
Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G} is the set of measurements performed by the verifier in Broadbent’s EPR protocol.
The questions for PV in the two sub-games are sampled from the same distribution. This ensures that the
PV is not able to tell which kind of game is being played. Hence, we can use our rigidity result of Theorem 1
to guarantee honest behavior of PV in the delegation sub-game. We call this protocol Verifier-on-a-Leash
Protocol, or “leash protocol” for short.
The protocol requires (2d + 1) rounds of interaction, where d is the depth of the circuit being delegated
(see Section 2.3 for a precise definition of how this is computed). The protocol requires O(n+ g) EPR pairs
to delegate a g-gate circuit on n qubits, and the overall time complexity of the protocol is O(g log g). The
input to the circuit is hidden from the provers, meaning that the protocol can be made blind by encoding the
circuit in the input, and delegating a universal circuit. We note that using universal circuits incurs a log n
factor increase in the depth of the circuit [BFGH10].
The completeness of the protocol follows directly from the completeness of [Bro18]. Once we ensure the
correct behavior of PV using our rigidity test, soundness follows from [Bro18] as well, since the combined
behavior of our verifier and an honest PV is nearly identical to that of Broadbent’s verifier.
The second protocol also starts from Broadbent’s protocol, but modifies it in a different way to achieve
a protocol that only requires a constant number of rounds of interaction. The proof of security is slightly
more involved, but the key ideas are the same: we use a combination of our new self-testing results and the
techniques of Broadbent’s protocol to control the two provers, one of which plays the role of Broadbent’s
verifier, and the other the role of the prover. Because of the more complicated “leash” structure in this
protocol, we call it the Dog-Walker Protocol. Like the leash protocol, the Dog-Walker Protocol has overall
time complexity O(g log g). Unlike the leash protocol, the Dog-Walker protocol is not blind. In particular,
while PV and PP would have to collude after the protocol is terminated to learn the input in the leash
protocol, in the Dog-Walker protocol, PV simply receives the input in the clear.
Based on the Dog-Walker Protocol, it is possible to design a classical-verifier two-prover protocol for
all languages in QMA. This is achieved along the same lines as the proof that QMIP = MIP∗ from [RUV13].
The first prover, given the input, creates the QMA witness and teleports it to the second prover with the help
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of the verifier. The verifier then delegates the verification circuit to the second prover, as in the Dog-Walker
Protocol; the first prover can be re-used to verify the operations of the second one.
Subsequent work. Bowles et al. [BvCA18] have independently re-derived a variant of our rigidity test
for multi-qubit σX , σY and σZ observables in the context of entanglement certification protocols in quantum
networks. Their self-test result has a slightly smaller set of questions but significantly weaker robustness
bounds.
Grilo [Gri17] presented a protocol for verifiable two-prover delegation of quantum computation by clas-
sical clients with a single round of communication, in which case space-like separation can replace the
non-communication assumption.
Open questions and directions for future work. We have introduced a new rigidity theorem and shown
how it can be used to transform a specific quantum-verifier delegation protocol, due to Broadbent, into a
classical-verifier protocol with an additional prover, while suffering very little overhead in terms of the effi-
ciency of the protocol. We believe that a similar transformation could be performed starting from delegation
protocols based on other models of computation, such as the protocol in the measurement-based model
of [FK17] or the protocol based on computation by teleportation considered in [RUV13], and would lead to
similar efficiency improvements.
Recently, [HZM+17] provided an experimental demonstration of a two-prover delegation protocol based
on [RUV13] for a 3-qubit quantum circuit based on Shor’s algorithm to factor the number 15; in order to
obtain an actual implementation, necessitating “only” on the order of 6000 CHSH tests, the authors had
to make the strong assumption that the devices behave in an i.i.d. manner at each use, and could not use
the most general testing results from [RUV13]. We believe that our improved rigidity theorem could lead
to an implementation that does not require any additional assumption. We also leave as an open problem
investigating whether (a variant of) our protocol can be made fault-tolerant, making it more suitable for
future implementation.
We note that our protocols require the verifier to communicate with one prover after at least one round
of communication with the other has been completed. Therefore, the requirement that the provers do not
communicate throughout the protocol cannot be enforced through space-like separation, and must be taken
as an a priori assumption. Since the protocol of [Gri17] is not blind, it is an open question whether there
exists a two-prover delegation protocol that consists of a single round of simultaneous communication with
each prover, and is blind and verifiable. We also wonder if the fact that blindness is compromised after the
provers collude is unavoidable in this model. A different avenue to achieve this is to rely on computational
assumptions on the power of the provers to achieve protocols with more properties (non-interactive, blind,
verifiable) [DSS16, ADSS17, Mah18a, Mah18b], albeit not necessarily in a truly efficient manner.
Finally, due to its efficiency and robustness, our ridigity theorem is a potentially useful tool in many other
cryptographic protocols. For instance, an interesting direction to explore is the possibility of exploiting our
theorem to achieve more efficient protocols for device-independent quantum key distribution, entanglement
certification or other cryptographic protocols involving more complex untrusted computation of the users.
Organization. In Section 2, we give the necessary preliminaries, including outlining Broadbent’s EPR
Protocol (Section 2.3). In Section 3, we introduce our new rigidity theorems. In Section 4, we present our
first protocol, the leash protocol, and in Section 5, we discuss our second protocol, the Dog-Walker Protocol.
In Section 6, we discuss the sequential repetition of our protocols.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We often write ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n for a string of bits, and W = W1 · · ·Wm ∈ Σm for a string,
where Σ is a finite alphabet. If S ⊆ {1, . . . , m} we write WS for the sub-string of W indexed by S. For
an event E, we use 1E to denote the indicator variable for that event, so 1E = 1 if E is true, and otherwise
1E = 0. We write poly(ε) for O(ε
c), where c is a universal constant that may change each time the notation
is used.
H is a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. We denote by U(H) the set of unitary operators, Obs(H) the
set of binary observables (we omit the term “binary” from here on; in this paper all observables are binary)
and Proj(H) the set of projective measurements on H respectively. We let |EPR〉 denote an EPR pair:
|EPR〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) .
Observables. We use capital letters X, Z, W, . . . to denote observables. We use greek letters σ, τ with a
subscript σW , τW , to emphasize that the observable W specified as subscript acts in a particular basis. For
example, X is an arbitrary observable but σX is specifically the Pauli X matrix defined in (1).
For a ∈ {0, 1}n and commuting observables σW1 , . . . , σWn , we write σW(a) = ∏ni=1(σWi)ai . The
associated projective measurements are σWi = σ
0
Wi
− σ1Wi and σuW = Ea(−1)u·aσW(a). Often the σWi will
be single-qubit observables acting on distinct qubits, in which case each is implicitly tensored with identity
outside of the qubit on which it acts.
Pauli and Clifford groups. Let
σI =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, σX =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σY =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
and σZ =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
(1)
denote the standard Pauli matrices acting on a qubit. The single-qubit Weyl-Heisenberg group
H(1) = H(Z2) =
{
(−1)cσX(a)σZ(b), a, b, c ∈ {0, 1}
}
is the matrix group generated by the Pauli σX and σZ. We let H(n) = H(Zn2) be the direct product of n
copies ofH(1). The n-qubit Clifford group is the normalizer of H(n) in the unitary group, up to phase:
G
(n)
C =
{
G ∈ U((C2)⊗n) : GσG† ∈ H(n) ∀σ ∈ H(n)}.
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Some Clifford observables we will use include
σH =
σX + σZ√
2
, σH′ =
σX − σZ√
2
, σF =
−σX + σY√
2
, σG =
σX + σY√
2
. (2)
Note that σH and σH′ are characterized by σXσHσX = σH′ and σZσHσZ = −σH′ . Similarly, σF and σG are
characterized by σXσFσX = −σG and σYσFσY = σG.
2.2 Quantum circuits
We use capital letters in sans-serif font to denote gates. We work with the universal quantum gate set
{CNOT,H,T}, where the controlled-not gate is the two-qubit gate with the unitary action
CNOT|b1, b2〉 = |b1, b1 ⊕ b2〉,
and the Hadamard and T gates are single-qubit gates with actions
H|b〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉+ (−1)b|1〉
)
and T|b〉 = eibπ/4|b〉,
respectively. We will also use the following gates:
X|b〉 = |b⊕ 1〉, Z|b〉 = (−1)b|b〉, and P|b〉 = ib|b〉.
Measurements in the Z basis (or computational basis) will be denoted by the standard measurement symbol:
To measure another observable, W, we can perform a unitary change of basis UW before the measurement
in the computational basis.
We assume that every circuit has a specified output wire, which is measured at the end of the computation
to obtain the output bit. Without loss of generality, we can assume this is always the first wire. For an n-
qubit system, we let Πb, for b ∈ {0, 1}, denote the orthogonal projector onto states with |b〉 in the output
wire: |b〉〈b| ⊗ Id. For example, the probability that a circuit Q outputs 0 on input |~x〉 is ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2.
We can always decompose a quantum circuit into layers such that each layer contains at most one T
gate applied to each wire. The minimum number of layers for which this is possible is called the T depth of
the circuit. We note that throughout this work, we will assume circuits are compiled in a specific form that
introduces extra T gates (see the paragraph on the H gadget in Section 2.3). The T depth of the resulting
circuit is proportional to the depth of the original circuit.
2.3 Broadbent’s EPR Protocol
In this section we summarize the main features of a delegation protocol introduced in [Bro18], highlighting
the aspects that will be relevant to understanding our subsequent adaptation into two-prover protocols. The
“EPR Protocol” from [Bro18] involves the interaction between a verifier VEPR and a prover P. We write
PEPR for the “honest” behavior of the prover. The verifier VEPR has limited quantum powers. Her goal is
to delegate a BQP computation to the prover P in a verifiable way. Specifically, the verifier has as input a
quantum circuit Q on n qubits and an input string ~x ∈ {0, 1}n , and the prover gets as input Q. The verifier
and prover interact. At the end of the protocol, the verifier outputs either accept or reject. The protocol is
such that there exist values psound and pcompl with psound < pcompl such that pcompl − psound, called the
soundness-completeness gap, is a constant independent of input size, and moreover:
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Completeness: If the prover is honest and ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≥ 2/3, then the verifier outputs accept with prob-
ability at least pcompl;
Soundness: If ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3, then the probability the verifier outputs accept is at most psound.
In the EPR protocol, VEPR and PEPR are assumed to share (n + t) EPR pairs at the start of the protocol,
where t is the number of T gates in Q and n the number of input bits. The first n EPR pairs correspond
to the input to the computation; they are indexed by N = {1, . . . , n}. The remaining pairs are indexed
by T = {n + 1, . . . , n + t}; they will be used as ancilla qubits to implement each of the T gates in the
delegated circuit. In [Bro18] the EPR protocol is only considered in the analysis, and it is assumed that the
EPR pairs are prepared by the verifier.
The behavior of VEPR depends on a round type randomly chosen by VEPR after her interaction with
PEPR. There are three possible round types:
• Computation round (r = 0): the verifier delegates the computation to PEPR, and at the end of the
round can recover its output if PEPR behaves honestly;
• X-test round (r = 1) and Z-test round (r = 2): the verifier tests that PEPR behaves honestly, and
rejects if malicious behavior is detected.
For some constant p, V chooses r = 0 with probability p, and otherwise chooses r ∈ {1, 2} with equal
probability. Since the choice of round type is made after interaction with PEPR, PEPR’s behavior cannot
depend on the round type. In particular, any deviating behavior in a computation round is reproduced in
both types of test rounds. The analysis amounts to showing that any deviating behavior that affects the
outcome of the computation will be detected in at least one of the test rounds.
In slightly more detail, the high-level structure of the protocol is the following. VEPR measures her halves
of the n qubits in N in order to prepare the input state on PEPR’s system. As a result the input is quantum
one-time padded with keys that depend on VEPR’s measurement results. For example, in a computation
round, VEPR measures each input qubit in the Z basis, and gets some result ~d ∈ {0, 1}n , meaning the input
on PEPR’s side has been prepared as X
~d|0〉⊗n. In [Bro18], the input is always considered to be~0, but we can
also prepare an arbitrary classical input ~x ∈ {0, 1}n by reinterpreting the one-time pad key as~a = ~d⊕~x so
that the input state on PEPR’s side is X
~a|~x〉. In a test round, on the other hand, the input is prepared as the
one-time pad of either |0〉⊗n or |+〉⊗n. Note that as indicated in Figure 2 this choice of measurements will
be made after the interaction with PEPR has taken place.
The honest prover PEPR applies the circuit Q, which we assume is compiled in the universal gate set
{H,T,CNOT}, to his one-time padded input. We will shortly describe gadgets that PEPR can apply in order
to implement each of the three gate types. The gadgets are designed in a way that in a test round each gadget
amounts to an application of an identity gate; this is what enables VEPR to perform certain tests in those
rounds that are meant to identify deviating behavior of a dishonest prover. After each gadget, the one-time
padded keys can be updated by VEPR, who is able to keep track of the keys at any point in the circuit using
the update rules in Table 2.
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TH
CNOT
Key Update Rule
(aj, bj)← (aj + ci, bj + ei + aj + ci + (aj + ci)zi)
(aj, bj)← (ei, 0)
(aj, bj)← (0, bj + ei + zi)
(aj, bj)← (bj, aj)
(aj, bj, aj′ , bj′)← (aj, bj + bj′ , aj + aj′ , bj′)
Computation Round
X-Test, even parity; or Z-test, odd parity
Z-Test, even parity; or X-test, odd parity
Table 2: Rules for updating the one-time-pad keys after applying each type of gate in the EPR Protocol, in
particular: after applying the i-th T gate to the j-th wire; applying an H gate to the j-th wire; or applying a
CNOT gate controlled on the j-th wire and targeting the j′-th wire.
We now describe the three gadgets, before giving a complete description of the protocol.
CNOT Gadget To implement a CNOT gate on wires j and j′, PEPR simply performs the CNOT gate
on those wires of his input qubits. The one-time pad keys are changed by the update rule in Table 2,
because CNOT ·XajZbj ⊗Xaj′Zbj′ = XajZbj+bj′ ⊗ Xaj+aj′Zbj′ · CNOT. Note that CNOT|0〉|0〉 = |0〉|0〉 and
CNOT|+〉|+〉 = |+〉|+〉, so in the test runs, PEPR is applying the identity.
H Gadget To implement an H gate on wire j, PEPR simply performs the H on wire j, and the one-time-
pad keys are changed as in Table 2. Unlike CNOT, H does not act as the identity on |0〉 and |+〉, so it is
not the identity in a test round. To remedy this, assume that Q is compiled so that every H gate appears
in a pattern H(TTH)k, where the maximal such k is odd. This can be accomplished by replacing each H
by HTTHTTHTTH, which implements the same unitary. In test rounds, the T gadget, described shortly,
implements the identity, and since H(IdH)k for odd k implements the identity, H(TTH)k will also have no
effect in test rounds.
Parity of a T Gate Within a pattern H(TTH)k, the H has the effect of switching between an X-test round
scenario (the state |0〉) and a Z-test round scenario (the state |+〉). In order to consistently talk about the
type of a round while evaluating the circuit, we can associate a parity with each T gate in the circuit. The
parity of the T gates that are not part of the pattern H(TTH)k will be defined to be even. A H will always
flip the parity, so that within such a pattern, the first two T gates will be odd, the next two will be even, etc.,
until the last two T gates will be odd again.
T Gadget The gadget for implementing the i-th T gate on the j-th wire is performed on PEPR’s j-th input
qubit, and his i-th auxiliary qubit (indexed by n + i), which we can think of as being prepared in a particular
auxiliary state by VEPR measuring her half of the corresponding EPR pair, as shown in Figure 1. The gadget
depends on a random bit zi that is chosen by VEPR and sent to the prover.
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VEPR
PEPR
~z ∈ {0, 1}t
~c ∈ {0, 1}t
c f ∈ {0, 1}
VrEPR
~x,~c,~z
~a,~b,~e
Figure 2: This figure describes how different pieces of
the protocol fit together. VEPR and PEPR share n + t
EPR pairs. The honest prover PEPR can be seen as a
procedure that acts on n + t qubits — the EPR pair
halves — depending on a t-bit string~z. We have sepa-
rated the quantum part of VEPR into its own procedure,
called VrEPR, where r ∈ {0, 1, 2} indicates the round
type, which VEPR runs on her n + t EPR halves, and
the 2t bits~c and~z. Aside from running VrEPR, VEPR is
classical.
j
n + i
Pzi
ci
UWi ei
Prover (PEPR){
Verifier (VEPR){
Figure 1: The gadget for implementing the i-th T gate on the j-th wire. The gate UWi implementing the
change of basis associated with observable Wi is applied as part of the procedure V
r
EPR (see Figure 3b) and
is determined by the round type r, the parity of the i-th T gate, zi, ci, and a
′
i (the X-key going into the i-th T
gate), as in Table 3.
Computation Round
X-Test Round
Z-Test Round
a′i ⊕ ci ⊕ zi = 0
a′i ⊕ ci ⊕ zi = 1
even T gate
odd T gate
zi = 0
zi = 1
odd T gate
even T gate
zi = 0
zi = 1
UWi (observable Wi)
HT (observable G)
HPT (observable F)
Id (observable Z)
H (observable X)
HP (observable Y)
Id (observable Z)
H (observable X)
HP (observable Y)
Table 3: The choice of UWi in the T gadget. We also indicate the observable Wi associated with the final
measurement Wi = U
†
Wi
ZUWi .
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The EPR Protocol. We show how the gadgets just described are used in the complete protocol. We first
describe the protocol for VEPR below. For later convenience we have divided the action of VEPR into classical
actions and a single quantum subroutine VrEPR depending on the round type.
The procedure VrEPR measures each of the n + t EPR halves according to some observable that depends
on r, ~c, and ~z. In the case of a computation round, V0EPR measures the qubits in T adaptively. We describe
the steps of VEPR, V
r
EPR and the honest behaviour of PEPR in Fig. 3.
1. VEPR sends~z ∈R {0, 1}t to PEPR, and receives back~c ∈ {0, 1}t and c f ∈ {0, 1}.
2. VEPR chooses a random round type r ∈ {0, 1, 2} and runs VrEPR (see Figure 3b) on her EPR halves,
~x,~c and~z, to obtain bits~a,~b ∈ {0, 1}n and~e ∈ {0, 1}t .
3. VEPR applies the update rules from Table 2 on the initial keys (~a,~b), gate-by-gate, to obtain, for every
i ∈ [t], the X-key before the i-th T gate is applied, a′i, and the final X key for the output wire, a′f . If
r = 1 (X-test round) and there exists an i such that the i-th T gate is even and ci 6= a′i ⊕ ei, output
reject. If r = 2 (Z-test round) and there exists an i such that the i-th T gate is odd and ci 6= a′i ⊕ ei,
output reject. If r ∈ {0, 1} (computation or X-test round) and c f ⊕ a′f 6= 0, output reject. Otherwise,
output accept.
(a) VEPR’s point of view.
Input: A circuit Q with t T gates, ~x ∈ {0, 1}n ,~c,~z ∈ {0, 1}t , an n-qubit system indexed by N, and a
t-qubit system indexed by T.
1. If r ∈ {0, 1}, measure each qubit in N in the Z basis, and otherwise measure in the X basis, to get
results ~d ∈ {0, 1}n . If r = 0, set (~a,~b) = (~d⊕~x, 0n); if r = 1, set (~a,~b) = (~d, 0n); and if r = 2 set
(~a,~b) = (0n, ~d).
2. Going through Q gate-by-gate, use the update rules in Table 2 to update the one-time-pad keys. For
every i ∈ [t], when the i-th T gate is reached, let a′i be the X key before the i-th T gate is applied.
Choose an observable Wi according to Table 3 in which to measure the i-th qubit in T, corresponding
to the i-th T gate, obtaining result ei.
(b) The procedure VrEPR, employed by VEPR.
1. Receive~z ∈ {0, 1}t from VEPR.
2. Evaluate Q gate-by-gate using the appropriate gadget for each gate. In particular, use zi to implement
the i-th T gadget, and obtain measurement result ci.
3. Measure the output qubit to obtain c f , and return~c and c f to VEPR.
(c) Honest prover strategy PEPR
Figure 3: The EPR Protocol.
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Completeness and Soundness. We summarize the relevant part of the analysis of the EPR protocol
from [Bro18]. First suppose PEPR behaves honestly. If ‖Π0Q|0n〉‖2 = p, then in a computation round,
VEPR outputs accept with probability p, whereas in a test round, VEPR outputs accept with probability 1.
This establishes completeness of the protocol:
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Suppose the verifier executes the EPR Protocol, choosing r = 0 with proba-
bility p, on an input (Q, |~x〉) such that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≥ 1− δ. Then the probability that VEPR accepts when
interacting with the honest prover PEPR is at least (1− p) + p(1− δ).
The following theorem is implicit in [Bro18, Section 7.6], but we include a brief proof sketch:
Theorem 3 (Soundness). Suppose the verifier executes the EPR Protocol, choosing r = 0 with probability p,
on an input (Q, |~x〉) such that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ δ. Let P∗EPR be an arbitrary prover such that P∗EPR is accepted
by VEPR with probability qt conditioned on r 6= 0, and qc conditioned on r = 0. Then the prover’s overall
acceptance probability is pqc + (1− p)qt, and
qc ≤ 2 (qt δ+ (1− qt))− δ.
Proof sketch. Using the notation of [Bro18], let E(ρ) = ∑k KkρK
†
k be the Kraus decomposition of an
arbitrary attack performed by a malicious prover on the m-qubit state resulting from an honest run of the
protocol.4 We write the k-th Kraus operator of E as a sum of Paulis Kk = ∑Q∈P (m)αk,QQ. Finally, we
define the set of benign attacks Bt,m ⊆ P (m) as the subset of Paulis containing I or Z in the positions that
are measured (in the computational basis) during the protocol.
Notice that the benign attacks do not affect the the acceptance of the protocol, and therefore the value
A = ∑k ∑Q 6∈Bt,n |αk,Q|2 can be interpreted then as the total weight on attacks that could change the outcome
of the computation. By [Bro18], the probability of rejecting in a computation round is 1 − qc ≥ (1 −
δ)(1 − A), whereas the probability of rejecting in a test round is 1 − qt ≥ 12 A. Combining these gives
qc ≤ 2(qtδ+ (1− qt))− δ.
3 Rigidity
Each of our delegation protocols includes a rigidity test that is meant to verify that one of the provers
measures his half of shared EPR pairs in a basis specified by the verifier, thereby preparing one of a specific
family of post-measurement states on the other prover’s space; the post-measurement states will form the
basis for the delegated computation. This will be used to certify that one of the provers in our two-prover
schemes essentially behaves as the quantum part of VEPR would in the EPR protocol.
In this section we outline the structure of the test, giving the important elements for its use in our del-
egation protocols. The test is parametrized by the number m of EPR pairs to be used. The test consists
of a single round of classical interaction between the verifier and the two provers. With constant proba-
bility the verifier sends one of the provers a string W chosen uniformly at random from Σm where the set
Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G} contains a label for each single-qubit observable to be tested. With the remaining
probability, other queries, requiring the measurement of observables not in Σm (such as the measurement of
pairs of qubits in the Bell basis), are sent.
4Note that we can assume such behaviour by the malicious prover without loss of generality since all measurements can be
performed coherently, with the first step of the attack undoing all honest operations.
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In general, an arbitrary strategy for the provers consists of an arbitrary entangled state |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB
(which we take to be pure), and measurements (which we take to be projective) for each possible question.5
This includes an m-bit outcome projective measurement {Wu}u∈{0,1}m for each of the queries W ∈ Σm.
Our rigidity result states that any strategy that succeeds with probability 1− ε in the test is within poly(ε) of
the honest strategy, up to local isometries (see Theorem 4 for a precise statement). This is almost true, but for
an irreconcilable ambiguity in the definition of the complex phase
√−1. The fact that complex conjugation
of observables leaves correlations invariant implies that no classical test can distinguish between the two
nontrivial inequivalent irreducible representations of the Pauli group, which are given by the Pauli matrices
σX , σY, σZ and their complex conjugates σX = σX , σZ = σZ, σY = −σY respectively. In particular, the
provers may use a strategy that uses a combination of both representations; as long as they do so consistently,
no test will be able to detect this behavior.6 . The formulation of our result accommodates this irreducible
degree of freedom by forcing the provers to use a single qubit, the (m + 1)-st, to make their choice of
representation (so honest provers require the use of (m + 1) EPR pairs to test the operation of m-fold tensor
products of observables from Σs).
Theorem 4 below summarizes the guarantees of our main test, which is denoted as RIGID(Σ, m). In-
formally, Theorem 4 establishes that a strategy that succeeds in RIGID(Σ, m) with probability at least 1− ǫ
must be such that (up to local isometries):
• The players’ joint state is close to a tensor product of m EPR pairs, together with an arbitrary ancilla
register;
• The projective measurements performed by either player upon receipt of a query of the form W ∈ Σm
are, on average over the uniformly random choice of W ∈ Σm, close to a measurement that consists
of first, measuring the ancilla register to extract a single bit that specifies whether to perform the ideal
measurements or their conjugated counterparts, and second, measuring the player’s m half-EPR pairs
in either the bases indicated by W, or their complex conjugate, depending on the bit obtained from
the ancilla register.
For an observable W ∈ Σ, let σW = σ+1W − σ−1W be its eigendecomposition, where σW are the “honest”
Pauli matrices defined in (1) and (2). For u ∈ {±1} let σuW,+ = σuW for W ∈ Σ, and
σuX,− = σ
u
X , σ
u
Z,− = σ
u
Z, σ
u
Y,− = σ
−u
Y , σ
u
F,− = σ
−u
G , σ
u
G,− = σ
−u
F .
(In words, σuW,− is just the complex conjugate of σ
u
W .) We note that for the purpose of our delegation
protocols, we made a particular choice of the set Σ. The result generalizes to any constant-sized set of single-
qubit Clifford observables, yielding a test for m-fold tensor products of single-qubit Clifford observables
from Σ.
Theorem 4. Let ε > 0 and m an integer. Suppose a strategy for the players succeeds with probability 1− ε
in test RIGID(Σ, m). For W ∈ Σm and D ∈ {A, B} let {Wu
D
}u be the measurement performed by prover
D on question W. Let also |ψ〉 be the state shared by the players. Then for D ∈ {A, B} there exists an
isometry
VD : HD → (C2)⊗mD′ ⊗HD̂
5We make the assumption that the players employ a pure-state strategy for convenience, but it is easy to check that all proofs
extend to the case of a mixed strategy. Moreover, it is always possible to consider (as we do) projective strategies only by applying
Naimark’s dilation theorem, and adding an auxiliary local system to each player as necessary, since no bound is assumed on the
dimension of their systems.
6See [RUV12, Appendix A] for an extended discussion of this issue, with a similar resolution to ours.
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such that ∥∥(VA ⊗VB)|ψ〉AB − |EPR〉⊗m ⊗ |AUX〉ÂB̂∥∥2 = O(√ε), (3)
and positive semidefinite matrices τλ on Â with orthogonal support, for λ ∈ {+,−}, such that Tr(τ+) +
Tr(τ−) = 1 and
E
W∈Σm ∑
u∈{±1}m
∥∥∥VATrB((IdA ⊗WuB)|ψ〉〈ψ|AB(IdA ⊗WuB)†)V†A
− ∑
λ∈{±}
( m⊗
i=1
σ
ui
Wi,λ
2
)
⊗ τλ
∥∥∥
1
= O(poly(ε)).
Moreover, players employing the honest strategy succeed with probability 1− e−Ω(m) in the test.
The proof of the theorem is based on standard techniques developed in the literature on “rigidity theo-
rems” for nonlocal games. We highlight two components. The first is a “conjugation test” that allows us
to extend the guarantees of elementary tests based on the CHSH game or the Magic Square game, which
test for Pauli σX and σZ observables, to a test for single-qubit Clifford observables — since the latter are
characterized by their action on the Pauli group. The second is an extension of the “Pauli braiding test”
from [NV17] to handle tensor products of not only σX and σZ, but also σY Pauli observables. As already
emphasized in the introduction, the improvements in efficiency of our scheme are partly enabled by the
strong guarantees of Theorem 4, and specifically the independence of the final error dependence from the
parameter m.
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 4. We start by introducing the language required to
formulate our testing results in Section 3.1. We follow by giving a test for the conjugation of one observable
to another by a unitary, the Conjugation Test, in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we apply the Conjugation Test
to test the relations that dictate how an arbitrary m-qubit Clifford unitary acts by conjugation on the Pauli
matrices. In Section 3.4 we specialize the test to the case of unitaries that can be expressed as the m-fold
tensor product of Clifford observables taken from the set Σ. In Sections 3.5 and 3.6, we decribe variants of
the test from Section 3.4, which are later employed in the Leash and Dog-Walker protocols.
3.1 Testing
In this section we recall the standard formalisms from self-testing, including state-dependent distance mea-
sure, local isometries, etc. We also introduce a framework of “tests for relations” that will be convenient to
formulate our results.
Distance measures. Ultimately our goal is to test that a player implements a certain tensor product of
single-qubit or two-qubit measurements defined by observables such as σX , σY, or σG. Since it is impossible
to detect whether a player applies a certain operation X on state |ψ〉, or VXV† on state V|ψ〉, for any
isometry V : L(H) → L(H′) such that V†V = Id, we will (as is standard in testing) focus on testing
identity up to local isometries. Towards this, we introduce the following important piece of notation:
Definition 5. For finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces HA and HA′ , δ > 0, and operators R ∈ L(HA) and
S ∈ L(H
A
′) we say that R and S are δ-isometric with respect to |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB, and write R ≃δ S, if
there exists an isometry V : HA → HA′ such that∥∥(R−V†SV)⊗ IdB |ψ〉∥∥2 = O(δ).
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If V is the identity, then we further say that R and S are δ-equivalent, and write R ≈δ S for ‖(R − S)⊗
IdB |ψ〉‖2 = O(δ).
The notation R ≃δ S carries some ambiguity, as it does not specify the state |ψ〉. The latter should
always be clear from context: we will often simply write that R and S are δ-isometric, without explicitly
specifying |ψ〉 or the isometry. The relation is transitive, but not reflexive: the operator on the right will
always act on a space of dimension at least as large as that on which the operator on the left acts. The notion
of δ-equivalence is both transitive (its square root obeys the triangle inequality) and reflexive, and we will
use it as our main notion of distance.
Tests. We formulate our tests as two-player games in which both players are treated symmetrically. We
often use the same symbol, a capital letter X, Z, W, . . . , to denote a question in the game and the associated
projective measurement {Wa} applied by the player upon receipt of that question. To a projective measure-
ment with outcomes in {0, 1}n we associate a family of observables W(u) parametrized by n-bit strings
u ∈ {0, 1}n , defined by W(u) = ∑a(−1)u·aWa. If n = 1 we simply write W = W(1) = W0 −W1; note
that W(0) = Id.
With the exception of the Tomography Test TOM presented in Section 3.6, all the games, or tests, we
consider implicitly include a “consistency test” which is meant to enforce that whenever both players are
sent identical questions, they produce matching answers. More precisely, let T be any of the two-player
tests described in the paper. Let PrT(W, W
′) be the distribution on questions (W, W ′) to the players that is
specified by T. Since the players are always treated symmetrically, PrT(·, ·) is permutation-invariant. Let
PrT(·) denote the marginal on either player. Then, instead of executing the test T as described, the verifier
performs the following:
(i) With probability 1/2, execute T.
(ii) With probability 1/2, select a random question W according to PrT(W). Send W to both players.
Accept if and only if the players’ answers are equal.
Then, success with probability at least 1− ε in the modified test implies success with probability at least 1−
2ε in the original test, as well as in the consistency test. If {Wa
A
} and {Wb
B
} are the players’ corresponding
projective measurements, the latter condition implies
∑
a
‖(Wa
A
⊗ Id− Id⊗Wa
B
)|ψ〉AB‖2 = 2− 2 ∑
a
〈ψ|Wa
A
⊗Wa
B
|ψ〉
≤ 4ε, (4)
so that Wa
A
⊗ Id ≈ε Id⊗WaB (where the condition should be interpreted on average over the choice of a
question W distributed as in the test). Similarly, if WA, WB are observables for the players that succeed
in the consistency test with probability 1 − 2ε we obtain WA ⊗ Id ≈ε Id⊗WB. We will often use both
relations to “switch” operators from one player’s space to the other’s; as a result we will also often omit an
explicit specification of which player’s space an observable is applied to.
Strategies. Given a two-player game, or test, a strategy for the players consists of a bipartite entangled
state |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB together with families of projective measurements {WaA} for Alice and {WaB} for
Bob, one for each question W that can be sent to either player in the test. As already mentioned, for
convenience we restrict our attention to pure-state strategies employing projective measurements. We will
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loosely refer to a strategy for the players as (W, |ψ〉), with the symbol W referring to the complete set of
projective measurements used by the players in the game; taking advantage of symmetry we often omit the
subscript A or B, as all statements involving observables for one player hold verbatim with the other player’s
observables as well.
Relations. We use R to denote a set of relations over variables X, Z, W, . . . , such as
R = {XZXZ = − Id, HX = ZH, X, Z, H ∈ Obs}.
We only consider relations that can be brought in the form of one of the following equations
• f (W) = (−1)aW1 · · ·Wk = Id, where the Wi are (not necessarily distinct) unitary variables and
a ∈ Z2, or
• f (W) = W1 · (∑a ωaWa2 ) = Id, where W1 is a unitary variable, {Wa2} a projective measurement
with s possible outcomes, and ωa are (arbitrary) s-th roots of unity.
Definition 6 (Rigid self-test). We say that a set of relations R is (c, δ(ε))-testable, on average under the
distribution D : R → [0, 1], if there exists a game (or test) G with question set Q that includes (at least) a
symbol for each variable inR that is either an observable or a POVM and such that:
• (Completeness) There exists a set of operators which exactly satisfy all relations in R and a strategy
for the players which uses these operators (together possibly with others for the additional questions)
that has success probability at least c;
• (Soundness) For any ε > 0 and any strategy (W, |ψ〉AB) that succeeds in the game with probability
at least c− ε, the associated measurement operators satisfy the relations inR up to δ(ε), in the state-
dependent norm. More precisely, on average over the choice of a relation f (W) = Id fromR chosen
according to D, it holds that ‖ Id⊗( f (W)− Id)|ψ〉AB‖2 ≤ δ(ε).
If both conditions hold, we also say that the game G is a robust (c, δ(ε)) self-test for the relations R.
Most of the games we consider have perfect completeness, c = 1, in which case we omit explicitly
mentioning the parameter. The distribution D will often be implicit from context, and we do not always
specify it explicitly (e.g. in case we only measure δ(ε) up to multiplicative factors of order |R| the exact
distribution D does not matter as long as it has complete support).
Definition 7 (Stable relations). We say that a set of relations R is δ(ε)-stable, on average under the dis-
tribution D : R → [0, 1], if for any two families of operators WA ∈ L(HA) and WB ∈ L(HB) that are
consistent on average, i.e.
E
f∼D
E
W∈U f
∥∥(Id⊗WB −WA ⊗ Id)|ψ〉∥∥2 ≤ ε,
where W ∈U f is shorthand for W being a uniformly random operator among those appearing in the
relation specified by f , and satisfy the relations on average, i.e.
E
f∼D:
f (W)=Id∈R
∥∥( f (WA)− Id)⊗ Id |ψ〉∥∥2 ≤ ε,
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there exists operators Wˆ which satisfy the same relations exactly and are δ(ε)-isometric to the W with
respect to |ψ〉, on average over the choice of a random relation inR and a uniformly random W appearing
in the relation, i.e. there exists an isometry VA such that
E
f∼D
E
W∈U f
∥∥(WˆA −V†AWAVA)⊗ Id |ψ〉∥∥2 = O(δ(ε)).
3.2 The conjugation test
We give a test which certifies that a unitary (not necessarily an observable) conjugates one observable to
another. More precisely, let A, B be observables, and R a unitary, acting on the same space H. The test
CONJ(A, B, R), given in Figure 4, certifies that the players implement observables of the form
XR =
(
0 R†
R 0
)
and C = CA,B =
(
A 0
0 B
)
(5)
such that XR and C commute. The fact that XR is an observable implies that R is unitary,
7 while the
commutation condition is equivalent to the relation RAR† = B. The test thus tests for the relations
C{R, C} = {XR, C, X, Z ∈ Obs} ∪ {XZ = −ZX} ∪ {XRC = CXR, XRZ = −ZXR, CZ = ZC}.
Here the anti-commuting observables X and Z are used to specify a basis in which XR and C can be
block-diagonalized. The anti-commutation and commutation relations with Z enforce that XR and C re-
spectively have the form described in (5). These relations are enforced using simple commutation and
anti-commutation tests that are standard in the literature on self-testing. For convenience, we state those
tests, COM and AC, in Appendix A. The conjugation test, which uses them as sub-tests, is given in Figure 4.
Here, “Inputs” refers to a subset of designated questions in the test; “Relation” indicates a relation that the
test aims to certify; “Test” describes the certification protocol. (Recall that all our protocols implicitly in-
clude a “consistency” test in which a question is chosen uniformly at random from the marginal distribution
and sent to both players, whose answers are accepted if and only if they are equal.)
7Note that R will not be directly accessed in the test, since by itself it does not necessarily correspond to a measurement.
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Test CONJ(A,B,R)
• Inputs: A and B observables on the same space H, and X and Z observables on H′. XR and C
observables on H⊗H′.
• Relations: C{R, C}, with R defined from XR, and C related to A and B, as in (5).
• Test: execute each of the following with equal probability
(a) With probability 1/8 each, execute tests AC(X, Z), COM(C, Z), COM(XR, C), AC(XR, Z) and
COM(A, X), COM(B, X), COM(A, Z), COM(B, Z).
(b) Ask one player to measure A, B, C or Z (with probability 1/4 each), and the other to jointly
measure A or B (with probability 1/2 each) and Z. The first player returns one bit, and the
second two bits. Reject if either:
– The first player was asked C, the second player was asked (A, Z), his second answer bit
is 0, and his first answer bit does not match the first player’s;
– The first player was asked C, the second player was asked (B, Z), his second answer bit
is 1, and his first answer bit does not match the first player’s.
– The first player was asked A, B, or Z and his answer bit does not match the corresponding
answer from the second player.
Figure 4: The conjugation test, CONJ(A, B, R).
Lemma 8. The test CONJ(A, B, R) is a (1, δ) self-test for the set of relations C{R, C}, for some δ =
O(
√
ε). Moreover, for any strategy that succeeds with probability at least 1 − ε in the test it holds that
C ≈δ A(Id+Z)/2 + B(Id−Z)/2, where A, B, C and Z are the observables applied by the prover on
receipt of a question with the same label.
Proof. Completeness is clear, as players making measurements on a maximally entangled state on HA ⊗
HB, tensored with an EPR pair on C2 ⊗C2 for the X and Z observables, and using XR and C defined in (5)
(with the blocks specified by the space associated with each player’s half-EPR pair) succeed in each test
with probability 1.
We now consider soundness. Success in AC(X, Z) in part (a) of the test implies the existence of local
isometries VA, VB such that VA : HA → HAˆ ⊗ C2A′ , with X ≃√ε IdAˆ ⊗σX and Z ≃√ε IdAˆ ⊗σZ. By
Lemma 31, approximate commutation with both X and Z implies that under the same isometry, A ≃√ε
AI ⊗ Id and B ≃√ε BI ⊗ Id, for observables AI , BI on HAˆ. Similarly, the parts of the test involving C
and XR imply that they each have the block decomposition specified in (5). In particular, anti-commutation
of XR with Z certifies that XR has a decomposition of the form XR ≃ RX ⊗ σX + RY ⊗ σY. Using that
XR is an observable, we deduce that there exists a unitary R on HAˆ such that R ≈ RX + iRY. Similarly,
commutation of C with Z implies that C ≃ CI ⊗ I + CZ ⊗ σZ, for Hermitian CI , CZ such that CI ± CZ are
observables.
Next we analyze part (b) of the test. Let {Wa,zAZ} be the projective measurement applied by the second
player upon query (A, Z). Success with probability 1−O(ε) in the first item ensures that∣∣〈ψ|C ⊗ (W00AZ −W10AZ)|ψ〉∣∣ = O(ε),
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and a similar condition holds from the second item, with WBZ instead of WAZ. Success with probability
1−O(ε) in the third item ensures consistency of {Wa,zAZ} (resp. {Wa,zBZ}) with the observable A (resp. B)
when marginalizing over the second outcome, and Z when marginalizing over the first outcome. Using the
decompositions for A, B and C derived earlier, we obtain CI ≈ (A + B)/2 and CZ ≈ (A− B)/2, giving
the “Moreover” part of the lemma.
Finally, success in test COM(XR, C) certifies the approximate commutation relation [XR, C] ≈√ε 0,
which, given the decomposition of XR and C obtained so far, implies RA ≈ BR, as desired.
3.3 Testing Clifford unitaries
Let m ≥ 1 be an integer, and R an m-qubit Clifford unitary. R is characterized, up to phase, by its action
by conjugation on the m-qubit Weyl-Heisenberg group. This action is described by linear functions hS :
{0, 1}m × {0, 1}m → Z4 and hX , hZ : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m such that
RσX(a)σZ(b)R
† = (−1)hS(a,b)σX(hX(a, b))σZ(hZ(a, b)), ∀a, b ∈ {0, 1}m . (6)
Using that (σX(a)σZ(b))
† = (−1)a·bσX(a)σZ(b), the same condition must hold of the right-hand side
of (6), thus hX(a, b) · hZ(a, b) = a · b mod 2. To any family of observables {X(a), Z(b), a, b ∈ {0, 1}m}
we associate, for a, b ∈ {0, 1}m ,
A(a, b) = ia·bX(a)Z(b), B(a, b) = ia·bX(hX(a, b))Z(hZ(a, b)), (7)
where the phase ia·b is introduced to ensure that A(a, b) and B(a, b) are observables. Define C(a, b) in
terms of A(a, b) and B(a, b) as in (5). The Clifford conjugation test aims to test for the conjugation relation
RA(a, b)R† = B(a, b), for all (in fact, on average over a randomly chosen) (a, b). For this, we first need a
test that ensures A(a, b) and B(a, b) themselves have the correct form, in terms of a tensor product of Pauli
observables. Such a test was introduced in [NV17], where it is called “Pauli braiding test”. The test certifies
the Pauli relations
P (m){X, Y, Z} =
{
W(a) ∈ Obs, W ∈ {X, Y, Z}m, a ∈ {0, 1}m
}
∪
{
W(a)W ′(a′) = (−1)|{i: Wi 6=W ′i∧aia′i=1}|W ′(a′)W(a), ∀W, W ′ ∈ {X, Y, Z}n, ∀a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}m
}
∪
{
W(a)W(a′) = W(a + a′), ∀a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}m
}
.
The Pauli braiding test is recalled in Appendix A.4, and we refer to the test as PBT(X, Y, Z). The original
test from [NV17] only allows to test for tensor products of σX and σZ Pauli observables, and we extend the
test to include Pauli σY. This requires us to provide a means to accommodate the phase ambiguity discussed
earlier. The result is described in the following lemma; we refer to Appendix A.4.2 for the proof. (In some
cases a simpler variant of the test, which does not attempt to test for the Y observable, will suffice. This is
essentially the original test from [NV17], which we call PBT(X, Z) and is introduced in Appendix A.4.1.)
Lemma 9. Suppose |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB and W(a) ∈ Obs(HA), for W ∈ {X, Y, Z}m and a ∈ {0, 1}m,
specify a strategy for the players that has success probability at least 1− ε in the extended Pauli braiding
test PBT(X, Y, Z) described in Figure 27. Then there exist a state |AUX〉
AˆBˆ
and isometries VD : HD →
((C2)⊗m)
D
′ ⊗ Hˆ
Dˆ
, for D ∈ {A, B}, such that∥∥(VA ⊗VB)|ψ〉AB − |EPR〉⊗mA′B′ |AUX〉AˆBˆ∥∥2 = O(√ε),
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and on expectation over W ∈ {X, Y, Z}m,
E
a∈{0,1}m
∥∥(W(a)−V†A(σW(a)⊗ ∆W(a))VA)⊗ IdB |ψ〉∥∥2 = O(√ε), (8)
where ∆W(a) = ∏i ∆
ai
Wi
∈ Obs(H
Aˆ
) are observables with ∆X = ∆Z = Id and ∆Y an arbitrary observable
on Hˆ such that ∥∥∆Y ⊗ ∆Y|AUX〉 − |AUX〉∥∥2 = O(√ε).
Building on the Pauli braiding test and the conjugation test from the previous section, the Clifford
conjugation test CONJ-CLIFF(R) described in Figure 5 provides a test for the set of relations
JhS ,hX ,hZ{R} = P (m){X, Y, Z} ∪ {R ∈ U} ∪ {∆Y ∈ Obs}
∪ {RX(a)Z(b)R† = ∆hS(a,b)Y X(hX(a, b))Z(hZ(a, b)), ∀a, b ∈ {0, 1}m}
∪ {∆YX(a) = X(a)∆Y , ∆YZ(b) = Z(b)∆Y, ∀a, b ∈ {0, 1}m}. (9)
Note the presence of the observable ∆Y, which arises from the conjugation ambiguity in the definition of Y
(see Lemma 9).
Test CONJ-CLIFF(R):
• Input: R an m-qubit Clifford unitary. Let hS, hX , hZ be such that (6) holds, and A(a, b), B(a, b) the
observables defined in (7).
• Relations: JhS ,hX ,hZ{R} defined in (9).
• Test: execute each of the following with equal probability
(a) Execute test PBT(X, Y, Z) on (m + 1) qubits, where the last qubit is called the “control” qubit;
(b) Select a, b ∈ {0, 1}m uniformly at random. Let C(a, b) be the observable defined from
A(a, b) and B(a, b) in (5), with the block structure specified by the control qubit. Execute
test CONJ{A(a, b), B(a, b), R}. In the test, to specify query A(a, b) or B(a, b), represent each
as a string in {I, X, Y, Z}m and use the same label as for the same query when it is used in
part (a).
Figure 5: The Clifford conjugation test, CONJ-CLIFF(R).
Lemma 10. Let R be an m-qubit Clifford unitary and hS, hX , hZ such that (6) holds. Suppose a strat-
egy for the players succeeds with probability at least 1 − ε in test CONJ-CLIFF(R). Let VA : HA →
((C2)⊗(m+1))
A
′ ⊗H
Aˆ
be the isometry whose existence follows from part (a) of the test, and ∆Y the observ-
able on H
Aˆ
′ that represents the phase ambiguity (see Lemma 9). Then there exists a unitary ΛR on HAˆ,
commuting with ∆Y, such that ∥∥ΛR ⊗ΛR|AUX〉 − |AUX〉∥∥2 = O(poly(ε)). (10)
Moreover, let τˆR be any m-qubit Clifford unitary, acting on the space (C
2)⊗m into which the isometry
VA maps, which satisfies the relations specified in (9), where for any location i ∈ {1, . . . , m} such that
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ai = bi = 1 we replace σXσZ by τY = σY ⊗ (i∆Y). Then, letting τR = τˆR(IdA′ ⊗ΛR) we have that under
the same isometry,
R ≃poly(ε) τR.
Note that τˆR is only defined up to phase in the lemma. Any representative will do, as the phase ambiguity
can be absorbed in ΛR. As an example, in this notation we have
τˆF =
1√
2
(− σX + σY ⊗ ∆Y), τˆG = 1√
2
(
σX + σY ⊗ ∆Y
)
, (11)
where the “honest” single-qubit Clifford observables σF and σG are defined in (2).
Completeness of the test is clear, as players making measurements on (m + 1) shared EPR pairs using
standard Pauli observables, R, and C(a, b) defined in (5) with A(a, b) and B(a, b) as in (7) will pass all tests
with probability 1.
Proof sketch. For D ∈ {A, B} let VD be the isometries that follow from part (a) of the test and Lemma 9.
According to (7), A(a, b) and B(a, b) can each be expressed (up to phase) as a tensor product of X, Y, Z
operators, where the number of occurrences of Y modulo 2 is a · b for A(a, b) and hX(a, b) · hZ(a, b) = a · b
mod 2 for B(a, b). Thus the labels used to specify the observables in A(a, b) and B(a, b) in part (b), together
with the analysis of part (a) and Lemma 9, imply that, under the same isometry, we have
A(a, b) ≃√ε σX(a)σZ(b)⊗ (i∆Y)a·b and B(a, b) ≃√ε σX(hX(a, b))σZ(hZ(a, b))⊗ (i∆Y)a·b+hS(a,b),
where the imaginary phase comes from (7). Applying the analysis of the conjugation test given in Lemma 8
shows that XR must have the form in (5), for some R that approximately conjugates A(a, b) to B(a, b), on
average over uniformly random a, b ∈ {0, 1}m.
Let τˆR be as defined in the paragraph preceding the lemma. Note that τˆR acts on HA′ and HAˆ. After
application of the isometry, R has an expansion
R ≃ τˆR ·
(
∑
a,b
σX(a)σZ(b)⊗ΛR(a, b)
)
, (12)
for arbitrary ΛR(a, b) on HAˆ; since τˆR is invertible such an expansion exists for any operator. Using the
approximate version of (6) certified by the conjugation test (Lemma 8),
RV†A
(
σX(a)σZ(b)⊗ ∆a·bY
)
VA ≈ V†A
(
σX(hX(a, b))σZ(hZ(a, b))⊗ ∆a·b+hS(a,b)Y
)
VAR,
where the approximation holds on average over a uniformly random choice of (a, b) and up to error that is
polynomial in ε but independent of m. Expanding out R and using the consistency relations between the
two provers,
∑
c,d
τˆR
(
σX(c)σZ(d)⊗ΛR(c, d)
)
⊗
(
(−1)a·bσX(a)σZ(b)⊗ ∆a·bY
)
≈ ∑
c,d
(
σX(hX(a, b))σZ(hZ(a, b))⊗ ∆a·b+hS(a,b)Y
)
τˆR
(
σX(c)σZ(d)⊗ΛR(c, d)
)
⊗ Id ,
(13)
where the factor (−1)a·b comes from using(
σX(a)σZ(b)⊗ Id
)|EPR〉⊗m = ( Id⊗(σX(a)σZ(b))T)|EPR〉⊗m .
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Using the conjugation relations satisfied, by definition, by τˆR, the right-hand side of (13) simplifies to
∑
c,d
τˆR
(
σX(a)σZ(b)σX(c)σZ(d)⊗ ∆a·bY ΛR(c, d)
)
⊗ Id . (14)
Next using the fact that the state on which the approximations are measured is maximally entangled across
registers A and B, together with the Pauli (anti-)commutation relations, to simplify the left-hand side of (13),
together with (14) we arrive at the approximation
∑
c,d
(
(−1)a·d+b·cσX(a + c)σZ(b + d)⊗ΛR(c, d)
)
⊗
(
Id⊗∆a·bY
)
≈ ∑
c,d
(
σX(a + c)σZ(b + d)⊗ ∆a·bY ΛR(c, d)
)
⊗ Id .
If (c, d) 6= (0, 0) a fraction about half of all (a, b) such that a · b = 0 satisfy a · d + b · c = 1. Using
that {σX(a)σZ(b)⊗ Id |EPR〉} are orthogonal for different (a, b), the above then implies that ΛR(c, d) ≈
−ΛR(c, d), on average over (c, d) 6= (0, 0). Hence ΛR(c, d) ≈ 0, on average over (c, d) 6= (0, 0).
Considering (a, b) such that a · b = 1 implies that ΛR(0, 0) approximately commutes with ∆Y. Finally, the
relation (10) follows from self-consistency of XR implicitly enforced in the test.
3.4 Tensor products of single-qubit Clifford observables
We turn to testing observables in the m-fold direct product of the Clifford group. Although the test can
be formulated more generally, for our purposes it will be sufficient to specialize it to the case where each
element in the direct product is an observable taken from the set Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G} associated with
the single-qubit Pauli observables defined in Section 2.1. Recall that the associated operators satisfy the
conjugation relation σYσFσY = σG, which will be tested as part of our procedures (specifically, item (c) in
Figure 6).
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Test CLIFF(Σ, m):
• Input: An integer m and a subset Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G} of the single-qubit Clifford group.
• Test: Select W ∈ Σm uniformly at random. Execute each of the following with equal probability:
(a) Execute the test CONJ-CLIFF(W);
(b) Send one player either the query W, or XW and the other (W, X(em+1)), where em+1 indicates
the control qubit used for part (a). Receive one bit from the first player, and two from the second.
If the query to the first player was W, check that the first player’s answer is consistent with the
second player’s first answer bit. If the query to the first player was XW , then: If the second
player’s second bit is 0, check that his first bit is consistent with the first player’s; If the second
player’s second bit is 1, check that his first bit is different than the first player’s.
(c) Let S and T be subsets of the positions in which Wi = F and Wi = G respectively, chosen
uniformly at random. Let W ′ equal W except W ′i = G for i ∈ S, and W ′i = F for i ∈ T. Let
R = Y(∑i∈S∪T ei). Execute test CONJ(W, W ′, R).
(d) Set W ′i = X (resp. Y) whenever Wi = Y (resp. X), W
′
i = F (resp. Gi) whenever Wi = G (resp.
F), and W ′i = X whenever Wi = Z. Execute test PBT(W, W
′) on m qubits.
(e) Let S and T be subsets of (non-overlapping) pairs of positions in which Wi = F and Wi = G
respectively, chosen uniformly at random. Send one player the query W, with entries (i, j) ∈
S ∪ T removed and replaced by Φi,j (indicating a measurement in the Bell basis).
– With probability 1/2, send the other player the query W. Check consistency of outcomes
associated with positions not in S∪ T. For outcomes in S∪ T, check the natural consistency
as well: e.g. if the Bell measurement indicated the outcome Φ00, then the two outcomes
reported by the other player at those locations should be identical.
– With probability 1/2, execute an independent copy of the Bell measurement test BELL
(Figure 25) between the first and second players in each of the pair of qubits in S ∪ T.
Figure 6: The m-qubit Clifford test, CLIFF(Σ, m).
The test is described in Figure 6. It is divided in five parts. Part (a) of the test executes CONJ-CLIFF(W)
to verify that an observable W ∈ Σm satisfies the appropriate Pauli conjugation relations (6). Note that
a priori test CONJ-CLIFF(W) only tests for the observable XW obtained from W in blocks as XR from R
in (5) (indeed, in that test W need not be an observable). Thus part (b) of the test is introduced to verify that
XW ≈ WX(em+1), where the (m + 1)-st qubit is the one used to specify the block decomposition relating
XW to W. The result of parts (a) and (b) is that, under the same isometry as used to specify the Pauli X
and Z, W ≃ τˆW · (Id⊗ΛW), according to the same decomposition as shown in Lemma 10. The goal of
the remaining three parts of the test is to verify that ΛW = Λ
|{i:Wi∈{F,G}}|
F , for a single observable ΛF.
For this, part (c) of the test verifies that ΛW only depends on the locations at which Wi ∈ {F, G}, but not
on the specific observables at those locations. Part (d) verifies that ΛW ≈ ∏i:Wi∈{F,G} Λi for commuting
observables Λi. Finally, part (e) checks that Λi is (approximately) independent of i.
Theorem 11. Suppose a strategy for the players succeeds in test CLIFF(Σ, m) (Figure 6) with probability at
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least 1− ε. Then for D ∈ {A, B} there exists an isometry
VD : HD → (C2)⊗mD′ ⊗HDˆ
such that ∥∥(VA ⊗VB)|ψ〉AB − |EPR〉⊗mA′B′ |AUX〉AˆBˆ∥∥2 = O(√ε), (15)
and
E
W∈Σm, c∈{0,1}m
∥∥ IdA ⊗(VBW(c)− τW(c)VB)|ψ〉AB∥∥2 = O(poly(ε)). (16)
Here τW is defined from W as in Lemma 10, with ΛWi = Id if Wi ∈ {X, Y, Z} and ΛWi = ΛF if
Wi ∈ {F, G}, where ΛF is an observable on HBˆ that commutes with ∆Y.
Proof sketch. The existence of the isometry, as well as (15) and (16) for W ∈ {I, X, Y, Z}m, follows from
the test PBT(X, Y, Z), executed as part of the Clifford conjugation test from part (a), and Lemma 9. Using
part (a) of the test and Lemma 10 it follows that every W ∈ Σm is mapped under the same isometry to
W ≃√ε τW = τˆW(Id⊗ΛW), (17)
where τˆW is as defined in the lemma and ΛW is an observable on HAˆ which may depend on the whole
string W; here we also use the consistency check in part (b) to relate the observable XW used in the Clifford
conjugation test with the observable W used in part (c). Note that from the definition we can write τˆW =
⊗iτˆWi , where in particular τˆX = σX , τˆZ = σZ and τˆY = σY ⊗ ∆Y.
The analysis of the conjugation test given in Lemma 8 shows that success with probability 1−O(ε) in
part (c) of the test implies the relations
τˆWτR(Id⊗ΛW) = τRτˆW(Id⊗ΛW)
≈√ε τˆW ′τR(Id⊗ΛW ′),
where the first equality is by definition of R, and uses that τY = σY ⊗ ∆Y and ∆Y commutes with ΛW ; the
approximation holds as a consequence of the conjugation test and should be understood on average over a
uniformly random choice of W ∈ Σm. Thus ΛW depends only on the locations at which Wi ∈ {F, G}, but
not on the particular values of the observables at those locations.
Part (d) of the test and Lemma 9 imply that the observables W(a) satisfy approximate linearity condi-
tions W(a)W(a′) ≈ W(a+ a′), on average over a uniformly random choice ofW ∈ Σn and a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}n .
Using the form (17) for W and the fact that the τˆW(a) satisfy the linearity relations by definition, we deduce
that ΛW(a)ΛW(a′) ≈ ΛW(a+a′) as well. Using the analysis of the Pauli braiding test (Lemma 9), this implies
that for each i and Wi there is an observable Λi,Wi such that the Λi,Wi pairwise commute and ΛW ≈ ∏i Λi,Wi .
Using the preceding observations, Λi,Wi ≈ Λi if Wi ∈ {F, G}, and Λi,Wi ≈ Id if Wi ∈ {X, Y, Z}.
Success in part (e) of the test implies the condition EW〈ψ|W ⊗ WΦ|ψ〉 ≥ 1 − O(ε), where W is
distributed as in the test, and WΦ is the observable applied by the second player upon a query W, with some
locations, indexed by pairs in S and T, have been replaced by the Φ symbol (as described in the test). Let
U be the set of i such that Wi ∈ {F, G}. Since ∆Y commutes with all observables in play, for clarity let us
assume in the following that ∆Y = Id. From the decomposition of the observables W obtained so far and
the analysis of the test BELL given in Lemma 32 it follows that
W ≃
(
⊗i τˆWi
)
⊗
(
∏
i∈U
Λi
)
, and WΦ ≃
(
⊗i/∈S∪T τˆWi
)
⊗
(
⊗(i,j)∈S∪T SWi,j
)
⊗
(
∏
i∈U\S∪T
Λi
)
,
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where the ordering of tensor products does not respect the ordering of qubits, but it should be clear which
registers each operator acts on. Using that for any operators A, B and ∆,
〈EPR|⊗2(A⊗ B⊗ |Φ00〉〈Φ00|)|EPR〉⊗2 = 1
8
Tr
(
ABT
)
,
the above conditions imply
E
S={(si,s′i)}
E
T={(ti,t′i)}
Λsi Λs′i Λti Λt
′
i
≈ Id,
where the expectation is taken over sets S and T specified as in part (e), for a given W, and on average
over the choice of W. Let Λ = Ei Λi. By an averaging argument it follows that for U the set of locations
such that Wi ∈ {F, G}, ∏i∈U Λi ≈ Λ|S|, again on average over the choice of W. To conclude we let
ΛF = Λ/|Λ|, which is an observable and satisfies the required conditions.
3.5 Post-measurement states
We give a first corollary of Theorem 11 which expresses its conclusion (16) in terms of the post-measurement
state of the first player. This corollary will be used in the analysis of the leash protocol from Section 4. To
obtain a useful result we would like to “lift” the phase ambiguity ΛW which remains in the statement of
Theorem 11 (in contrast to the ambiguity ∆Y, which itself cannot be lifted solely by examining correlations).
This ambiguity means that the provers have the liberty of choosing to report opposite outcomes whenever
they apply an F or G observable, but they have to be consistent between themselves and across all of their
qubits in doing so. To verify that the provers use the “right” labeling for their outcomes we incorporate a
small tomography test in the test, described in Figure 7. Note that an inconvenience of the tomography is
that the test no longer achieves perfect completeness (although completeness remains exponentially close
to 1).
Test RIGID(Σ, m):
• Input: An integer m and a subset Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G} of the single-qubit Clifford group.
• Test: execute each of the following with equal probability:
(a) Execute the test CLIFF(Σ, m);
(b) Send each player a uniformly random query W, W ′ ∈ Σm. Let T ⊆ {1, . . . , m} be the subset of
positions i such that Wi ∈ {X, Y} and W ′i ∈ {F, G}. Reject if the fraction of answers (ai, bi),
for i ∈ T, from the provers that satisfy the CHSH correlations (i.e. ai 6= bi if and only if
(Wi, W
′
i ) = (X, F)) is not at least cos
2 π
8 − 0.1.
Figure 7: The n-qubit rigidity test, RIGID(Σ, m).
For an observable W ∈ Σ, let σW = σ+1W − σ−1W be its eigendecomposition, where σW are the “honest”
Pauli matrices defined in (1) and (2). For u ∈ {±1} let σW,+ = σuW for W ∈ Σ, and
σuX,− = σ
u
X , σ
u
Z,− = σ
u
Z, σ
u
Y,− = σ
−u
Y , σ
u
F,− = σ
−u
G , σ
u
G,− = σ
−u
F .
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Corollary 12. Let ε > 0 and m an integer. Suppose a strategy for the players succeeds with probability
1− ε in test RIGID(Σ, m). Then for D ∈ {A, B} there exists an isometry
VD : HD → (C2)⊗mD′ ⊗HDˆ
such that ∥∥(VA ⊗VB)|ψ〉AB − |EPR〉⊗m ⊗ |AUX〉AˆBˆ∥∥2 = O(√ε), (18)
and positive semidefinite matrices τλ on Aˆ with orthogonal support, for λ ∈ {+,−}, such that Tr(τ+) +
Tr(τ−) = 1 and
E
W∈Σm ∑
u∈{±1}m
∥∥∥VATrB((IdA ⊗WuB)|ψ〉〈ψ|AB(IdA ⊗WuB)†)V†A − ∑
λ∈{±}
( m⊗
i=1
σ
ui
Wi,λ
2
)
⊗ τλ
∥∥∥
1
(19)
= O(poly(ε)).
Moreover, players employing the honest strategy succeed with probability 1− e−Ω(m) in the test.
Proof. From Theorem 11 we get isometries VA, VB and commuting observables ∆Y, ΛF on HAˆ such that
the conclusions of the theorem hold. Write the eigendecomposition ∆Y = ∆
+
Y − ∆−Y and ΛF = Λ+F −Λ−F .
For λ ∈ {+,−}2 let
τλ = TrBˆ
((
Id
Aˆ
⊗∆λ1Y Λλ2F
)|AUX〉〈AUX|( Id
Aˆ
⊗∆λ1Y Λλ2F
))
.
Using that ∆Y and ΛF commute and satisfy
∆Y ⊗ ∆Y|AUX〉 ≈ ΛF ⊗ΛF|AUX〉 ≈ |AUX〉
it follows that the (sub-normalized) densities τλ have (approximately) orthogonal support. In particular the
provers’ strategy in part (b) of the test is well-approximated by a mixture of four strategies, labeled by
(λY,λF) ∈ {±1}2, such that the strategy with label (λY,λF) uses the observables
(X, Z, Y, F, G) =
(
σX , σZ, λYσY,
1√
2
λF
(− σX + λYσY), 1√
2
λF
(
σX + λYσY
))
.
Among these four strategies, the two with λF = −1 fail part (b) of the test with probability exponentially
close to 1. Success in both parts of the test with probability at least 1− 2ε each thus implies
Tr
(
τ+−
)
+ Tr
(
τ−−
)
= poly(ε). (20)
For W ∈ Σm and c ∈ {0, 1}m the observable W(c) = ⊗iWcii can be expanded in terms of a 2m-outcome
projective measurement {Wu} as
W(c) = ∑
u∈{0,1}m
(−1)u·c Wu.
Similarly, by definition the projective measurement associated with the commuting Pauli observables τW(c) =
⊗iτciWi , c ∈ {0, 1}m , is
τuW =
⊗
i
(
E
c∈{0,1}m
(−1)u·cτW(c)
)
.
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Thus,
E
c∈{0,1}m
∥∥ IdA ⊗(W(c)−V†BτW(c)VB)|ψ〉AB∥∥2
= E
c∈{0,1}m
∥∥∥∑
u
(−1)u·c IdA ⊗
(
Wu −V†BτuWVB
)|ψ〉AB∥∥∥2
= ∑
u∈{0,1}m
∥∥ IdA ⊗(Wu −V†BτuWVB)|ψ〉AB∥∥2, (21)
where the third line is obtained by expanding the square and using Ec∈{0,1}m(−1)v·c = 1 if v = 0m, and 0
otherwise. Using (16), the expression in (21), when averaged over all W ∈ Σm, is bounded by O(poly(ε)).
Using the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequality and the fact that trace distance cannot increase under tracing out,
we get that the following is O(poly(ε)):
E
W∈Σm ∑u
∥∥∥VATrB((IdA⊗Wu)|ψ〉〈ψ|(IdA ⊗Wu)†)V†A − TrB((IdA ⊗τuW)|ψ〉〈ψ|(IdA⊗τuW)†)∥∥∥
1
. (22)
Using that τX = σX , τZ = σZ, and τY = σY∆Y, we deduce the post-measurement states for u ∈ {±1}
τuX = σ
u
X , τ
u
Z = σ
u
Z, τ
u
Y = σ
u
Y ⊗ (τ++ + τ+−) + σ−uY ⊗ (τ−+ + τ−−).
Similarly, from τF = (−τX + τY)ΛF and τG = (τX + τY)ΛF we get that e.g. the +1 eigenspace of τF is
the combination of:
• The simultaneous+1 eigenspace of σF = (−σX + σY)/
√
2,+1 eigenspace of ∆Y, and+1 eigenspace
of ΛF;
• The simultaneous −1 eigenspace of σF, +1 eigenspace of ∆Y, and −1 eigenspace of ΛF;
• The simultaneous −1 eigenspace of σG = −(−σX − σY)/
√
2, −1 eigenspace of ∆Y, and +1
eigenspace of ΛF;
• The simultaneous +1 eigenspace of σG, −1 eigenspace of ∆Y, and −1 eigenspace of ΛF.
Proceeding similarly with τG, we obtain
τuF = σ
u
F ⊗ τ++ + σ−uF ⊗ τ+− + σ−uG ⊗ τ−+ + σuG ⊗ τ−−,
τuG = σ
u
G ⊗ τ++ + σ−uG ⊗ τ+− + σ−uF ⊗ τ−+ + σuF ⊗ τ−−.
Starting from (22) and using (15) we obtain
E
W∈Σm ∑u
∥∥∥VATrB((IdA ⊗Wu)|ψ〉〈ψ|(IdA⊗Wu)†)V†A
− TrB
(
(IdA⊗τuW)|EPR〉〈EPR|⊗m ⊗ |AUX〉〈AUX|AˆBˆ(IdA ⊗τuW)†
)∥∥∥
1
= O(poly(ε)).
Since TrB(Id⊗B|EPR〉〈EPR|AB Id⊗B†) = (B†B)T/2 for any single-qubit operator B, to conclude the
bound claimed in the theorem it only remains to apply the calculations above and use (20) to eliminate the
contribution of τ+− and τ−−; the factor 12 comes from the reduced density matrix of an EPR pair.
3.6 Tomography
Theorem 11 and Corollary 12 show that success in test RIGID(Σ, m) gives us control over the players’
observables and post-measurement states in the test. This allows us to use one of the players to perform
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some kind of limited tomography (limited to post-measurement states obtained from measurements in Σ),
that will be useful for our analysis of the Dog-Walker Protocol from Section 5.
Let 1 ≤ m′ ≤ m and consider the test TOM(Σ, m′, m) described in Figure 8. In this test, one player is
sent a question W ∈ Σm chosen uniformly at random. Assuming the players are also successful in the test
RIGID(Σ, m) (which can be checked independently, with some probability), using that the input distribution
µ in RIGID(Σ, m) assigns weight at least |Σ|−m/2 to any W ′ ∈ Σm, from Corollary 12 it follows that the
second player’s post-measurement state is close to a state consistent with the first player’s reported outcomes.
Now suppose the second player is sent a random subset S ⊆ [m] of size |S| = m′, and is allowed to report
an arbitrary string W ′ ∈ Σm′ , together with outcomes u. Suppose also that for each i ∈ S, we require that
ui = ai whenever W
′
i = Wi. Since the latter condition is satisfied by a constant fraction of i ∈ {1, . . . , m′},
irrespective of W ′, with very high probability, it follows that the only possibility for the second player to
satisfy the condition is to actually measure his qubits precisely in the basis that he indicates. This allows us
to check that a player performs the measurement that he claims, even if the player has the choice of which
measurement to report.
Tomography Test TOM(Σ, m′, m):
• Input: Integer 1 ≤ m′ ≤ m and a subset Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G} of the single-qubit Clifford group.
• Test: Let S ⊆ [m] be chosen uniformly at random among all sets of size |S| = m′. Select W ∈ Σm
uniformly at random. Send W to the first player, and the set S to the second. Receive a from the first
player, and W ′ ∈ Σm′ and u from the second. Accept only if ai = ui whenever i ∈ S and Wi = W ′i .
Figure 8: The m-qubit tomography test TOM(Σ, m′, m).
Corollary 13. Let ε > 0 and 1 ≤ m′ ≤ m integer. Suppose a strategy for the players succeeds with
probability 1− ε in both tests RIGID(Σ, m) (Figure 7) and TOM(Σ, m′, m) (Figure 8). Let VA, VB be the
isometries specified in Corollary 12. Let {QW ′,u} be the projective measurement applied by the second
player in TOM(Σ, m′, m). Then there exists a distribution q on Σm′ × {±} such that
∑
W ′∈Σm′
∑
u∈{±1}m′
∥∥∥Tr
ABˆ
(
(IdA ⊗VBQW ′,u)|ψ〉〈ψ|AB(IdA ⊗VBQW ′,u)†
)
− ∑
λ∈{±}
q(W ′,λ)
( m′⊗
i=1
1
2
σui
W ′i ,λ
)∥∥∥
1
= O(poly(ε)),
where the notation is the same as in Corollary 12.
Moreover, players employing the honest strategy succeed with probability 1 in tomography part of the
test.
Proof. Success in RIGID(Σ, m) allows us to apply Corollary 12. For any (W ′, u) let ρW
′,u
A’,λ be the post-
measurement state on the first player’s space, conditioned on the second player’s answer in test TOM(Σ, m′, m)
being (W ′, u), after application of the isometry VA, and conditioned on HAˆ being in a state that lies in the
support of τλ (note this makes sense since τ+, τ− have orthogonal support). Using that for any i ∈ S,
Wi = W
′
i with constant probability |Σ|−1, it follows from (18) and (19) in Corollary 12 that success in
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TOM(Σ, m) implies the condition
E
S⊆{1,...,m}
|S|=m′
∑
W ′,λ,u
Tr(τλ)Tr
(( |Σ| − 1
|Σ| Id+
1
|Σ| ⊗i∈S σ
ui
W ′i ,λ
)
ρW
′,u
A’,λ
)
= 1−O(poly(ε)). (23)
Eq (23) concludes the proof, for some distribution q(W ′,λ) ≈ ∑u Tr(ρW
′,u
A’,λ )Tr(τλ) (the approximation is
due to the fact that the latter expression only specifies a distribution up to error O(poly(ε)).
4 The Verifier-on-a-Leash Protocol
4.1 Protocol and statement of results
The Verifier-on-a-Leash Protocol (or “Leash Protocol” for short) involves a classical verifier and two quan-
tum provers. The idea behind the Leash Protocol is to have a first prover, nicknamed PV for Prover V,
carry out the quantum part of VEPR from Broadbent’s EPR Protocol by implementing the procedure V
r
EPR.
(See Section 2.3 for a summary of the protocol and a description of VEPR. Throughout this section we
assume that the circuit Q provided as input is compiled in the format described in Section 2.3.). A second
prover, nicknamed PP for Prover P, will play the part of the prover PEPR. Unlike in the EPR Protocol,
the interaction with PV (i.e. running VrEPR) will take place first, and PV will be asked to perform random
measurements from the set Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G}. The values~z, rather than being chosen at random, will be
chosen based on the corresponding choice of observable. We let n be the number of input bits and t number
of T gates in Q.
The protocol is divided into two sub-games; which game is played is chosen by the verifier by flipping
a biased coin with probability (pr , pd = 1− pr).
• The first game is a sequential version of the rigidity game RIGID(Σ, m) described in Figure 14. This
aims to enforce that PV performs precisely the right measurements;
• The second game is the delegation game, described in Figures 11, 12, and 13, and whose structure is
summarized in Figure 9. Here the verifier guides PP through the computation in a similar way as in
the EPR Protocol.
We call the resulting protocol the Leash Protocol with parameters (pr , pd). In both sub-games the
parameter m = Θ(n + t) is chosen large enough so that with probability close to 1 each symbol in Σ
appears in a random W ∈ Σm at least n + t times. It is important that PV is not able to tell which kind of
game is being played. Notice also that in order to ensure blindness, we will require that the interaction with
PV in the delegation game is sequential (more details on this are found in Section 4.4). In order for the two
sub-games to be indistinguishable, we also require that the rigidity game RIGID(Σ, m) be played sequentially
(i.e. certain subsets of questions and answers are exchanged sequentially, but the acceptance condition in
the test is the same). Note, importantly, that the rigidity guarantees of RIGID(Σ, m) hold verbatim when
the game is played sequentially, since this only reduces the number of ways that the provers can cheat. The
following theorem states the guarantees of the Leash Protocol.
Theorem 14. There are constants pr , pd = 1− pr, and ∆ > 0 such that the following hold of the Verifier-
on-a-Leash Protocol with parameters (pr, pd), when executed on an input (Q, |~x〉).
• (Completeness:) Suppose that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≥ 2/3. Then there is a strategy for PV and PP that is
accepted with probability at least pcompl = pr(1− e−Ω(n+t)) + 8pd/9.
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• (Soundness:) Suppose that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3. Then any strategy for PV and PP is accepted with
probability at most psound = pcompl − ∆.
Further, the protocol leaks no information about ~x to either prover individually, aside from an upper bound
on the length of ~x.
The proof of the completeness property is given in Lemma 15. The soundness property is shown in
Lemma 18. Blindness is established in Section 4.4. We first give a detailed description of the protocol.
We start by describing the delegation game, specified in Figures 11, 12 and 13, which describe the protocol
from the verifier’s view, an honest PV’s view, and an honest PP’s view respectively. This will motivate
the need for a sequential version of the game RIGID(Σ, m), described in Figure 14. As we will show, the
rigidity game forces PV to behave honestly. Thus, for the purpose of exposition, we assume for now that
PV behaves honestly, which results in the joint behavior of PV and V being similar to that of the verifier
VEPR in the EPR Protocol.
Verifer
Prover V
Prover P
A, WA ∈ Σ|A|
~eA ∈ {0, 1}|A|
B1, WB1 ∈ Σ|B1|
~eB1 ∈ {0, 1}|B1 |
...
Bd, WBd ∈ Σ|Bd|
~eBd ∈ {0, 1}|Bd |
T, N ⊂ [m]
~cT1 ∈ {0, 1}T1
~zT1 ∈ {0, 1}T1
...
~cTℓ ∈ {0, 1}Tℓ
~zTℓ ∈ {0, 1}Tℓ
c f ∈ {0, 1}
Figure 9: Structure of the delegation game.
From the rigidity game we may also assume that PV and
PP share m EPR pairs, labeled {1, . . . , m}, for m = Θ(n+ t).
We will assume that the circuit Q is broken into d layers, Q =
Q1 . . . Qd, such that in every Qℓ, each wire has at most one T
gate applied to it, after which no other gates are applied to that
wire. We will suppose the T gates are indexed from 1 to t, in
order of layer.
The protocol begins with an interaction between the ver-
ifier and PV. The verifier selects a uniformly random parti-
tion A, B1, . . . , Bd of {1, . . . , m}, with |A| = Θ(n), and for
every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d}, |Bℓ| = Θ(tℓ), where tℓ is the num-
ber of T gates in Qℓ. The verifier also selects a uniformly
random W ∈ Σm, and partitions it into substrings WA and
WB1 , . . . , WBd , meant to contain observables to initialize the
computation qubits and auxiliary qubits for each layer of T
gates respectively. The verifier instructs PV to measure his
halves of the EPR pairs using the observables WA first, and
then WB1 , . . . , WBd , sequentially. Upon being instructed to
measure a set of observables, PV measures the corresponding
half-EPR pairs and returns the results ~e to the verifier. Break-
ing this interaction into multiple rounds is meant to enforce
that, for example, the results output by PV upon receiving
WBℓ , which we call ~eBℓ , cannot depend on the choice of ob-
servables WBℓ+1 . This is required for blindness.
Once the interaction with PV has been completed, as in the EPR Protocol, V selects one of three round
types: computation (r = 0), X-test (r = 1), and Z-test (r = 2). The verifier selects a subset N ⊂ A
of size n of qubits to play the role of inputs to the computation. These are chosen from the subset of A
corresponding to wires that PV has measured in the appropriate observable for the round type (see Table 4).
For example, in an X-test round, PV’s EPR halves corresponding to input wires should be measured in the
Z basis so that PP is left with a one-time pad of the state |0〉⊗n, so in an X-test round, the computation wires
are chosen from the set {i ∈ A : Wi = Z}. The input wires N are labeled by X1, . . . ,Xn.
The verifier also chooses subsets Tℓ = T
0
ℓ
∪ T1
ℓ
⊂ Bℓ of sizes tℓ,0 and tℓ,1 = tℓ− tℓ,0 respectively, where
tℓ,0 is the number of odd T gates in the ℓ-th layer of Q (recall the definition of even and odd T gates from
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Section 2.3). The wires T0
ℓ
and T1
ℓ
will play the role of auxiliary states used to perform T gates from the ℓ-th
layer. They are chosen from those wires from Bℓ whose corresponding EPR halves have been measured in a
correct basis, depending on the round type. For example, in an X-test round, the auxiliaries corresponding
to odd T gates should be prepared by measuring the corresponding EPR half in either the X or Y basis (see
Table 3), so in an X-test round, T1
ℓ
is chosen from {i ∈ Bℓ : Wi ∈ {X, Y}} (see Table 4). We will let
T1, . . . , Tt label those EPR pairs that will be used as auxiliary states. In particular, the system Ti will be
used for the i-th T gate in the circuit, so if the i-th T gate is even, Ti should be chosen from T0 = ∪ℓT0ℓ , and
otherwise it should be chosen from T1 = ∪ℓT1ℓ . The verifier sends labels T1, . . . , Tt and X1, . . . ,Xn to PP,
who will act as PEPR on the n + t qubits specified by these labels.
Just as in the EPR Protocol, the input on PP’s system specified by X1, . . . ,Xn is a quantum one-time
pad of either |~x〉, |0〉⊗n, or |+〉⊗n, depending on the round type, with V holding the keys (determined by~e).
Throughout the interaction, PP always maintains a one-time pad of the current state of the computation,
with the verifier in possession of the one-time-pad keys. The verifier updates her keys as the computation is
carried out, using the rules in Table 2.
From PP’s perspective, the protocol works just as the EPR Protocol, except that he does not receive the
bit zi needed to implement the T gadget until during the T gadget, after he has sent V his measurement
result ci (see Figure 10).
To perform the i-th T gate on the j-th wire, PP performs the circuit shown in Figure 10. As Figure 10
shows, PV has already applied the observable specified by V to his half of the EPR pair. The T gadget
requires interaction with the verifier, to compute the bit zi, which depends on the measured ci, the value Wi,
and one-time-pad key aj, however, this interaction can be done in parallel for T gates in the same layer.
Xj Xj
Ti
ci
Pzi
zi
zi =

aj + ci if Wi = G
aj + ci + 1 if Wi = F
z ∈R {0, 1} if Wi = Z
0 if Wi = X
1 if Wi = Y
UWi
Wi ∈R {X, Y, Z, G, F} ei
PP
PV
V V
Figure 10: The gadget for implementing the i-th T gate, on the j-th wire.
It is simple to check that the T gadget in Figure 10 is the same as the T gadget for the EPR Protocol
shown in Figure 1. In the case of the leash protocol, W is chosen at random, and then~z is chosen accordingly,
whereas in the case of the EPR Protocol,~z is chosen at random and then W is chosen accordingly.
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Computation Round X-test Round Z-test Round
N {i ∈ A : Wi = Z} {i ∈ A : Wi = Z} {i ∈ A : Wi = X}
T0
ℓ
{i ∈ Bℓ : Wi ∈ {G, F}} {i ∈ Bℓ : Wi = Z} {i ∈ Bℓ : Wi ∈ {X, Y}}
T1
ℓ
{i ∈ Bℓ : Wi ∈ {G, F}} {i ∈ Bℓ : Wi ∈ {X, Y}} {i ∈ Bℓ : Wi = Z}
Table 4: How the verifier chooses index sets T = T0 ∪ T1 and N for each type of round. These sets
determine which systems are labeled by {Ti}ti=1 and {Xj}nj=1, respectively.
We now give the precise protocols for V (Figure 11) and honest provers PV (Figure 12) and PP (Figure 13).
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Let (Q,~x) be the input to the verifier, where Q is compiled in the form described in Section 2.3. Let n be
the size of the input to Q. Let d be the T-depth, and for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d} let tℓ be the number of T gates in
the ℓ-th layer.
1. The verifier selects W ∈R Σm. She partitions {1, . . . , m} arbitrarily into non-overlapping subsets
A and B1, . . . , Bd such that WA contains at least n copies of each symbol in Σ, and for each ℓ ∈
{1, . . . , d}, WBℓ contains at least tℓ copies of each symbol in Σ.
2. The verifier sends A, WA to PV, who returns ~eA ∈ {0, 1}A . The verifier sequentially sends
(B1, WB1), . . . , (Bd, WBd) to PV, each time receiving~eBℓ ∈ {0, 1}Bℓ as answer.
3. The verifier selects a round type uniformly at random. She selects sets N ⊆ A and Tℓ ⊆ Bℓ, for
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d}, of sizes |N| = n and |Tℓ| = tℓ, as follows:
Computation Round: N is chosen at random from {i ∈ A : Wi = Z}. Tℓ is chosen at random from
{i ∈ Bℓ : Wi ∈ {G, F}}. She sets~a =~eN +~x and~b = 0n.
X-test Round: N is chosen at random from {i ∈ A : Wi = Z}. Tℓ = T0ℓ ∪ T1ℓ , where T0ℓ is of size
tℓ,0 chosen at random from {i ∈ Bℓ : Wi = Z} and T1ℓ is of size tℓ,1 chosen at random from
{i ∈ Bℓ : Wi ∈ {X, Y}}. She sets~a = ~eN and~b = 0n.
Z-test Round: N is chosen at random from {i ∈ A : Wi = X}. Tℓ = T0ℓ ∪ T1ℓ , where T0ℓ is of size
tℓ,0 chosen at random from {i ∈ Bℓ : Wi ∈ {X, Y}} and T1ℓ is of size tℓ,1 chosen at random
from {i ∈ Bℓ : Wi = Z}. She sets~a = 0n and~b = ~eN .
The verifier sends the sets N and T0
ℓ
, T1
ℓ
, for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d}, to PP.
4. For ℓ = 1, . . . , d,
(a) For each Clifford gate in the ℓ-th layer, perform the appropriate key update (Table 2).
(b) The verifier receives ~c = {ci}i∈Tℓ from PP. If it’s an X-test round and i ∈ T0ℓ , or it’s a Z-test
round and i ∈ T1
ℓ
, reject if ci 6= aj + ei, where j is the wire to which the i-th T gate is applied.
(c) For each i ∈ Tℓ, the verifier computes~z = {zi}i∈Tℓ as follows:
Computation Round zi = aj + 1Wi=F + ci ;
X-test Round if i ∈ T0
ℓ
, zi ∈R {0, 1}; else if i ∈ T1ℓ , zi = 1Wi=Y;
Z-test Round if i ∈ T0
ℓ
, zi = 1Wi=Y; else if i ∈ T1ℓ , zi ∈R {0, 1}.
(d) The verifier sends~z to PP and updates keys for each T gate applied (Table 2).
5. The verifier receives a bit c f from PP. She outputs reject if it’s a computation or X-test round and
c f + a f 6= 0, where a f is the final X-key on the output wire; and accept otherwise.
Figure 11: The Delegation Game: Verifier’s point of view.
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1. PP receives subsets N and T0
ℓ
, T1
ℓ
of {1, . . . , m}, for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d}, from the verifier.
2. For ℓ = 1, . . . , d,
(a) PP does the Clifford computations in the ℓ-th layer.
(b) For each i ∈ Tℓ = T0ℓ ∪ T1ℓ , PP applies a CNOT from Ti into the input register corresponding
to the wire on which this T gate should be performed, Xj, and measures this wire to get a value
ci. The register Ti is relabeled Xj. He sends~cTℓ = {ci}i∈Tℓ to V.
(c) PP receives~zTℓ = {zi}i∈Tℓ from V. For each i ∈ Tℓ, he applies Pzi to the corresponding Xj.
3. PP performs the final computations that occur after the d-th layer of T gates, measures the output
qubit, X1, and sends the resulting bit, c f , to V.
Figure 13: Honest strategy for PP
1. For ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , d,
(a) PV receives a string WS ∈ ΣS, for some subset S of {1, . . . , m}, from V.
(b) For i ∈ S, PV measures his half of the i-th EPR pair using the observable indicated by Wi,
obtaining an outcome ei ∈ {0, 1}.
(c) PV returns~eS to V.
Figure 12: Honest strategy for PV
Finally, we describe the sequential version of the game RIGID(Σ, m) in Figure 14. It is no different than
RIGID(Σ, m), except for the fact that certain subsets of questions and answers are exchanged sequentially,
but the acceptance condition is the same. As mentioned earlier, running the game sequentially only reduces
the provers’ ability to cheat. Hence the guarantees from RIGID(Σ, m) hold verbatim for the sequential
version.
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Let m, n, and t1, . . . , td be parameters provided as input, such that m = Θ(n + t1 + · · ·+ td).
1. The verifier selects questions W, W ′ ∈ Σm, for the first and second player respectively, according
to the distribution of questions in the game RIGID(Σ, m). She partitions {1, . . . , m} at random into
subsets A and Bℓ, for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d}, of size |A| = Θ(n) and |Bℓ| = Θ(tℓ), exactly as in Step 1 of
the Delegation Game.
2. The verifier sends (A, WA), (B1, WB1), .., (Bd, WBd) and (A, W
′
A), (B1, W
′
B1
), .., (Bd, W
′
Bd
) in se-
quence to the first and second prover respectively. They sequentially return respectively ~eA ∈
{0, 1}|A| , ~eB1 ∈ {0, 1}|B1 |, ..,~eBd ∈ {0, 1}|Bd | and ~e′A ∈ {0, 1}|A| , ~e′B1 ∈ {0, 1}|B1 |, ..,~e′Bd ∈
{0, 1}|Bd |.
3. The verifier accepts if and only if~e,~e′ and W, W ′ satisfy the winning condition of RIGID(Σ, m).
Figure 14: Sequential version of RIGID(Σ, m).
4.2 Completeness
Lemma 15. Suppose the verifier executes the rigidity game with probability pr and the delegation game
with probability pd = 1− pr , on an input (Q, |~x〉) such that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≥ 2/3. Then there is a strategy
for the provers which is accepted with probability at least pcompl = pr(1− e−Ω(n+t)) + 89 pd.
Proof. The provers PV and PP play the rigidity game according to the honest strategy, and the delegation
game as described in Figures 12 and 13 respectively. Their success probability in the delegation game is the
same as the honest strategy in the EPR Protocol, which is at least 23 +
2
3
1
3 =
8
9 , by Theorem 2 and since in
our protocol the verifier chooses each of the three types of rounds uniformly.
4.3 Soundness
We divide the soundness analysis into three parts. First we analyze the case of an honest PV, and a cheating
PP (Lemma 16). Then we show that if PV and PP pass the rigidity game with almost optimal probability,
then one can construct new provers PV′ and PP′, with PV′ honest, such that the probability that they are
accepted in the delegation game is not changed by much (Lemma 17). In Lemma 18, we combine the
previous to derive the desired constant soundness-completeness gap, where we exclude that the acceptance
probability of the provers in the rigidity game is too low by picking a pr large enough.
Lemma 16 (Soundness against PP). Suppose the verifier executes the delegation game on input (Q, |~x〉)
such that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3 with provers (PV, PP∗) such that PV plays the honest strategy. Then the
verifier accepts with probability at most 7/9.
Proof. Let PP∗ be any prover. Assume that PV behaves honestly and applies the measurements specified
by his query W on halves of EPR pairs shared with PP∗. As a result the corresponding half-EPR pair at PP∗
is projected onto the post-measurement state associated with the outcome reported by PV to V.
From PP∗, we define another prover, P∗, such that if P∗ interacts with VEPR, the honest verifer for the
EPR Protocol (Figure 3a), then VEPR rejects with the same probability that V would reject on interaction with
PP∗. The main idea of the proof can be seen by looking at Figure 10, and noticing that: (1) the combined
action of V and PV is unchanged if instead of choosing the Wi-values at random and then choosing zi as a
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function of these, the zi are chosen uniformly at random, and then the Wi are chosen as a function of these;
and (2) with this transformation, the combined action of V and PV is now the same as the action of VEPR in
the EPR Protocol.
We now define P∗. P∗ acts on a system that includes n + t qubits that, in an honest run of the EPR
Protocol, are halves of EPR pairs shared with VEPR. P
∗ receives {zi}ti=1 from VEPR. P∗ creates m− (n+ t)
half EPR pairs (i.e. single-qubit maximally mixed states) and randomly permutes these with his n + t
unmeasured qubits, n of which correspond to computation qubits on systems X1, . . . ,Xn — he sets N to
be the indices of these qubits — and t of which correspond to T-auxiliary states — he sets T0 and T1 to
be the indices of these qubits. P∗ simulates PP∗ on these m qubits in the following way. First, P∗ gives
PP∗ the index sets N, T0, and T1. In the ℓ-th iteration of the loop (Step 2. in Figure 13), PP∗ returns some
bits {ci}i∈Tℓ , and then expects inputs {zi}i∈Tℓ , which P∗ provides, using the bits he received from VEPR.
Finally, at the end of the computation, PP∗ returns a bit c f , and P∗ outputs {ci}i∈T and c f .
This completes the description of P∗. To show the lemma we argue that for any input (Q, |~x〉) the proba-
bility that V outputs accept on interaction with PV and PP∗ is the same as the probability that VEPR outputs
accept on interaction with P∗, which is at most 23 qt +
1
3 qc whenever ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3, by Theorem 3.
Using δ = 13 , Theorem 3 gives qc ≤ 53 − 43 qt, which yields
2
3
qt +
1
3
qc ≤ 5
9
+
2
9
qt ≤ 7
9
.
There are two reasons that VEPR might reject: (1) in a computation or X-test round, the output qubit
decodes to 1; or (2) in an evaluation of the gadget in Figure 10 (either an X-test round for an even T gate,
or a Z-test round for an odd T gate) the condition ci = aj ⊕ ei fails.
We first consider case (1). This occurs exactly when c f ⊕ a f = 1, where a f is the final X key of the
output wire, held by VEPR. We note that a f is exactly the final X key that V would hold in the Verifier-on-
a-Leash Protocol, which follows from the fact that the update rules in both the EPR Protocol and the leash
protocol are the same. Thus, the probability that VEPR finds v f ⊕ a f = 1 on interaction with P∗ is exactly
the probability that V finds c f ⊕ a f = 1 in Step 5 of Figure 11.
Next, consider case (2). The condition ci 6= aj ⊕ ei is exactly the condition in which a verifier interacting
with P∗ as in Figure 11 would reject (see Step 4.(b)).
Thus, the probability that VEPR outputs reject upon interaction with P
∗ is exactly the probability that V
outputs reject on interaction with PP∗, which, as discussed above, is at most 7/9.
The following lemma shows soundness against cheating PV∗.
Lemma 17. Suppose the verifier executes the leash protocol on input (Q, |~x〉) such that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3
with provers (PV∗, PP∗), such that the provers are accepted with probability 1− ε, for some ε > 0, in the
rigidity game, and with probability at least q in the delegation game. Then there exist provers PP′ and PV′
such that PV′ applies the honest strategy and PP′ and PV′ are accepted with probability at least q−poly(ε)
in the delegation game.
Proof. By assumption, PP∗ and PV∗ are accepted in the rigidity game with probability at least 1− ε. Let
VA, VB be the local isometries guaranteed to exist by Theorem 4, and {τλ} the sub-normalized densities
associated with PP∗’s Hilbert space (recall that playing the rigidity game sequentially leaves the guarantees
from Theorem 4 unchanged, since it only reduces the provers’ ability to cheat).
First define provers PV′′ and PP′′ as follows. PP′′ and PV′′ initially share the state
|ψ′〉AB = ⊗mi=1|EPR〉〈EPR|AB ⊗ ∑
λ∈{±}
|λ〉〈λ|
A
′ ⊗ |λ〉〈λ|
B
′ ⊗ (τλ)A′′ ,
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with registers AA′A′′ in the possession of PP′′ and BB′ in the possession of PV′′. Upon receiving a query
W ∈ Σm, PV′′ measures B′ to obtain a λ ∈ {±}. If λ = + he proceeds honestly, measuring his half-
EPR pairs exactly as instructed. If λ = − he proceeds honestly except that for every honest single-qubit
observable specified by W, he instead measures the complex conjugate observable. Note that this strategy
can be implemented irrespective of whether W is given at once, as in the game RIGID, or sequentially, as in
the Delegation Game. PP′′ simply acts like PP∗, just with the isometry VA applied.
First note that by Theorem 4, the distribution of answers of PV′′ to the verifier, as well as the subsequent
interaction between the verifier and PP, generate (classical) transcripts that are within statistical distance
poly(ε) from those generated by PV∗ and PP∗ with the same verifier.
Next we observe that taking the complex conjugate of both provers’ actions does not change their ac-
ceptance probability in the delegation game, since the interaction with the verifier is completely classical.
Define PP′ as follows: PP′ measures A′ to obtain the same λ as PV′′, and then executes PP′′ or its complex
conjugate depending on the value of λ. Define PV′ to execute the honest behavior (he measures to obtain
λ, but then discards it and does not take any complex conjugates).
Then PV′ applies the honest strategy, and (PV′, PP′) applies either the same strategy as (PV′′, PP′′)
(if λ = +) or its complex conjugate (if λ = −). Therefore they are accepted in the delegation game with
exactly the same probability.
Combining Lemma 16 and Lemma 17 gives us the final soundness guarantee.
Lemma 18. (Constant soundness-completeness gap) There exist constants pr, pd = 1 − pr and ∆ > 0
such that if the verifier executes the leash protocol with parameters (pr, pd) on input (Q, |~x〉) such that
‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3, any provers (PV∗, PP∗) are accepted with probability at most psound = pcompl − ∆.
Proof. Suppose provers PP∗ and PV∗ succeed in the delegation game with probability 79 +w for some w >
0, and the testing game with probability 1− ε∗(w), where ε∗(w)will be specified below. By Lemma 17, this
implies that there exist provers PP′ and PV′ such that PV′ is honest and the provers succeed in the delegation
game with probability at least 79 + w− g(ε∗(w)), where g(ε) = poly(ε) is the function from the guarantee
of Lemma 17. Let ε∗(w) be such that g(ε∗(w)) ≤ w2 . In particular, 79 +w− g(ε∗(w)) ≥ 79 + w2 > 79 . This
contradicts Lemma 16.
Thus if provers PP and PV succeed in the delegation game with probability 79 + w they must succeed in
the rigidity game with probability less than 1− ε∗(w). This implies that for any strategy of the provers, on
any no instance, the probability that they are accepted is at most
max
{
pr + (1− pr)
(7
9
+
1
18
)
, pr
(
1− ε∗
( 1
18
))
+ (1− pr) · 1
}
. (24)
Since ε∗( 118) is a positive constant, it is clear that one can pick pr large enough so that
pr
(
1− ε∗
( 1
18
))
+ (1− pr) · 1 < pr + (1− pr)
(7
9
+
1
18
)
. (25)
Select the smallest such pr. Then the probability that the two provers are accepted is at most
psound := pr + (1− pr)
(7
9
+
1
18
)
< pr
(
1− e−Ω(n+t))+ (1− pr)8
9
= pcompl ,
which gives the desired constant completeness-soundness gap ∆.
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4.4 Blindness
We now establish blindness of the Leash Protocol. In Lemma 19, we will prove that the protocol has the
property that neither prover can learn anything about the input to the circuit, ~x, aside from its length. Thus,
the protocol can be turned into a blind protocol, where Q is also hidden, by modifying any input (Q,~x)
where Q has g gates and acts on n qubits, to an input (Ug,n, (Q,~x)), where Ug,n is a universal circuit
that takes as input a description of a g-gate circuit Q on n qubits, and a string ~x, and outputs Q|~x〉. The
universal circuit Ug,n can be implemented in O(g log n) gates. By Lemma 19, running the Leash Protocol
on (Ug,n, (Q,~x)) reveals nothing about Q or ~x aside from g and n.
In the form presented in Figure 11, the verifier V interacts first with PV, sending him random questions
that are independent from the input ~x, aside from the input length n. It is thus clear that the protocol is blind
with respect to PV.
In contrast, the questions to PP depend on PV’s answers and on the input, so it may a priori seem like
the questions can leak information to PP. To show that the protocol is also blind with respect to PP, we
show that there is an alternative formulation, in which the verifier first interacts with PP, sending him random
messages, and then only with PV, with whom the interaction is now adaptive. We argue that, for an arbitrary
strategy of the provers, the reduced state of all registers available to either prover, PP or PV, is exactly the
same in both formulations of the protocol — the original and the alternative one. This establishes blindness
for both provers. This technique for proving blindness is already used in [RUV13] to establish blindness of
a two-prover protocol based on computation by teleportation.
Lemma 19 (Blindness of the Leash Protocol). For any strategy of PV∗ and PP∗, the reduced state of PV∗
(resp. PP∗) at the end of the leash protocol is independent of the input ~x, aside from its length.
Proof. Let PV∗ and PP∗ denote two arbitrary strategies for the provers in the leash protocol. Each of these
strategies can be modeled as a super-operator
TPV : L(HTPV ⊗HPV)→ L(HT ′PV ⊗HPV),
TPP,ad : L(HTPP ⊗HPP) → L(HT ′PP ⊗HPP).
Here HTPV and HT ′PV (resp. HTPP and HT ′PP ) are classical registers containing the inputs and outputs to and
from PV∗ (resp. PP∗), andHPV (resp.HPP) is the private space of PV∗ (resp. PP∗). Note that the interaction
of each prover with the verifier is sequential, and we use TPV and TPP,ad to denote the combined action of
the prover and the verifier across all rounds of interaction (formally these are sequences of superoperators).
Consider an alternative protocol, which proceeds as follows. The verifier first interacts with PP. From
Figure 13 we see that the inputs required for PP are subsets N and T1, . . . , Td, and values {zi}i∈Tℓ for each
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , d}. To select the former, the verifier proceeds as in the first step of the Delegation Game. She
selects the latter uniformly at random. The verifier collects values {ci}i∈Tℓ from PP exactly as in the original
Delegation Game.
Once the interaction with PP has been completed, the verifier interacts with PV. First, she selects a
random string WN ∈ ΣN , conditioned on the event that WN contains at least n copies of each symbol in Σ,
and sends it to PV, collecting answers~eN . The verifier then follows the same update rules as in the delegation
game. We describe this explicitly for computation rounds. First, the verifier sets~a = ~eN . Depending on the
values {ci}i∈T1 and {zi}i∈T1 obtained in the interaction with PP, using the equation zi = aj + 1Wi=F + ci
she deduces a value for 1Wi=F for each i ∈ T1 ⊆ B1. She then selects a uniformly random WB1 ∈ ΣB1 ,
conditioned on the event that WB1 contains at least t1 copies of each symbol from Σ, and for i ∈ T1 it
holds that Wi = F if and only if zi = aj + 1 + ci. The important observation is that, if T1 is a uniformly
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random, unknown subset, the marginal distribution on WB1 induced by the distribution described above is
independent of whether zi = aj + 1+ ci or zi = aj + 0+ ci: precisely, it is uniform conditioned on the event
that WB1 contains at least t1 copies of each symbol from Σ. The verifier receives outcomes ~eB1 ∈ {0, 1}B1
from PV, and using these outcomes performs the appropriate key update rules; she then proceeds to the
second layer of the circuit, until the end of the computation. Finally, the verifier accepts using the same rule
as in the last step of the original delegation game.
We claim that both the original and alternative protocols generate the same joint final state:
TPP,ad ◦ TPV(ρorig) = TPV,ad ◦ TPP(ρalt) ∈ HPP ⊗HT ′PP⊗HV ⊗HT ′PV⊗HPV, (26)
where we use ρorig and ρalt to denote the joint initial state of the provers, as well as the verifier’s initialization
of her workspace, in the original and alternative protocols respectively, and TPV,ad and TPP are the equivalent
of TPV and TPP,ad for the reversed protocol (in particular they correspond to the same strategies PV∗ and
PP∗ used to define TPV and TPP,ad). Notice that TPV,ad and TPP are well-defined since neither prover can
distinguish an execution of the original from the alternative protocol.8 To see that equality holds in (26), it is
possible to re-write the final state of the protocol as the result of the following sequence of operations. First,
the verifier initializes the message registers with PP∗ and PV∗ using half-EPR pairs, keeping the other halves
in her private workspace. This simulates the generation of uniform random messages to both provers. Then,
the superoperator TPV ⊗ TPP is executed. Finally, the verifier post-selects by applying a projection operator
onHTPV ⊗HT ′PV ⊗HTPP ⊗HT ′PP that projects onto valid transcripts for the original protocol (i.e. transcripts
in which the adaptive questions are chosen correctly). This projection can be implemented in two equivalent
ways: either the verifier first measures HTPV ⊗HT ′PV , and then HTPP ⊗HT ′PP ; based on the outcomes she
accepts a valid transcript for the original protocol or she rejects. Or, she first measures HTPP ⊗HT ′PP , and
then HTPV ⊗HT ′PV ; based on the outcomes she accepts a valid transcript for the alternative protocol or she
rejects. Using the commutation of the provers’ actions, conditioned on the transcript being accepted, the
first gives rise to the first final state in (26), and the second to the second final state. The two are equivalent
because the acceptance condition for a valid transcript is identical in the two versions of the protocol.
Since in the first case the reduced state on HT ′PV ⊗HPV is independent of the input to the computation,
~x, and in the second the reduced state onHPP⊗HT ′PP is independent of ~x, we deduce that the protocol hides
the input from each of PV∗ and PP∗.
5 Dog-Walker protocol
The Dog-Walker Protocol again involves a classical verifier V and two provers PV and PP. As in the leash
protocol presented in Section 4, PP and PV take the roles of PEPR and VEPR from [Bro18] respectively. The
main difference is that the Dog-Walker Protocol gives up blindness in order to reduce the number of rounds
to two (one round of interaction with each prover, played sequentially). After one round of communication
with PP, who returns a sequence of measurement outcomes, V communicates all of PP’s outcomes, except
for the one corresponding to the output bit of the computation, as well as the input ~x, to PV. With these,
PV can perform the required adaptive measurements without the need to interact with V. It may seem risky
to communicate bits sent by PP directly to PV — this seems to allow for communication between the two
provers! Indeed, blindness is lost. However, if PP is honest, his outcomes {ci}i in the computation round are
the result of measurements he performs on half-EPR pairs, and are uniform random bits. If he is dishonest,
8One must ensure that a prover does not realize if the alternative protocol is executed instead of the original; this is easily
enforced by only interacting with any of the provers at specific, publicly decided times.
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and does not return the outcomes obtained by performing the right measurements, he will be caught in the
test rounds. It is only in computation rounds that V sends the measurement results {ci}i to PV.
We notice that PV has a much more important role in this protocol: he decides himself the measurements
to perform according to previous measurements’ outcomes as well as the input x. For this reason, we must
augment the test discussed in Section 3 in order to test if PV remains honest with respect to these new tasks.
For this reason, we introduce the Tomography test and prove a rigidity theorem that will allow us to prove
the soundness of the Dog-walker protocol (see Figure 18 for a glimpse of the proof structure).
Finally, the Dog-Walker Protocol can be easily extended to a classical-verifier two-prover protocol for
all languages in QMA. Along the same lines of the proof that QMIP = MIP∗ from [RUV13], one of the
provers plays the role of PP, running the QMA verification circuit, while the second prover creates and
teleports the corresponding QMA witness. In our case, it is not hard to see that the second prover can be
re-used as PV in the Dog-Walker Protocol, creating the necessary gadgets for the computation and allowing
the Verifier to check the operations performed by the first prover. We describe the protocol in Section 5.4.
5.1 Protocol and statement of results
Throughout this section we let Σ = {X, Y, Z, F, G}, and let m = Θ(n + t) be chosen large enough so that
each symbol in Σ appears at least n + t times in a uniform random W ∈ Σm, with probability close to 1.
Let µ(W) denote the probability that a player receives input W while playing RIGID(Σ, m) (recall that both
players have the same marginals in RIGID). Let µ(W ′|W) denote the probability that one player receives
W ′ given that the other player receives W.
The full protocols are presented in Figure 15 (verifier’s point of view), Figure 17 (PV’s point of view)
and Figure 16 (PP’s point of view). The protocol has two types of rounds: EPR and Rigidity. Within an EPR
round are three types of sub-rounds: Computation sub-round, X-test sub-round, and Z-test sub-round. We
will generally think of X- and Z-test sub-rounds as one sub-round type (Test sub-round). Within a Rigidity
round are two types of sub-rounds: Tomography sub-round, which should be thought of as the Rigidity
version of the EPR-Computation round; and Clifford sub-round, which should be thought of as the Rigidity
version of the EPR-Test round. With some probability p1, V runs a Rigidity round, Clifford sub-round; with
some probability p2, V runs an EPR round, Test sub-round; with some probability p3, V runs an EPR round,
Computation sub-round; and with probability p4 = 1− p1 − p2 − p3, V runs a Rigidity round, Tomography
sub-round. We call this the Dog-Walker Protocol with parameters (p1, p2, p3, p4).
The following theorem states the guarantees of the Dog-Walker Protocol.
Theorem 20. There exist constants p1, p2, p3, p4 = 1− p1 − p2 − p3, and ∆ > 0 such that the following
hold of the Dog-Walker Protocol with parameters (p1, p2, p3, p4), when executed on input (Q, |~x〉).
• (Completeness: ) Suppose that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≥ 2/3. Then there is a strategy for PV and PP that is
accepted with probability at least pcompl = p1(1− e−Ω(n+t)) + p2 + 23 p3 + p4.
• (Soundness: ) Suppose that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3. Then any strategy for PV and PP is accepted with
probability at most psound = pcompl − ∆.
The proof of completeness is given in Lemma 21, and proof of soundness is given in Lemma 26.
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1. Select a round type EPR or Rigidity, and disjoint sets N, T0, T1 ⊂ {1, . . . , m} of sizes n, t0 and t− t0.
EPR Choose ~z uniformly at random from {0, 1}t and send it, along with N, T0 and T1, to PP. Receive
measurement outcomes~c ∈ {0, 1}t and c f ∈ {0, 1} from PP.
Rigidity Choose W ′ according to µ(·) and send it to PP. Receive~e′ ∈ {0, 1}m from PP.
2. Select a sub-round type at random from Computation, X Test or Z Test.
Computation Based on whether it’s an EPR or a Rigidity Round:
EPR (i) Send ~x, ~z, ~c and sets N, T0 and T1 to PV, and receive measurement outcomes ~a,~b ∈
{0, 1}n and~e ∈ {0, 1}t .
(ii) Apply the update rules from Table 2 gate-by-gate to obtain the final X key for the output
wire a′f . If c f + a
′
f 6= 0, reject.
Rigidity (Tomography) (i) Choose uniform random strings ~c,~z ∈ {0, 1}t , ~x ∈ {0, 1}n to send to
PV, along with N and T, and receive measurement outcomes ~d ∈ {0, 1}n and~e ∈ {0, 1}t .
(ii) From ~x, ~c, ~z, ~d, and ~e, determine the adaptive measurements W ∈ Σn+t that V0EPR would
have performed (based on Figure 3b), and reject if the input-output pairs (W ′,~e′) and (N ∪
T, (W,~e)) do not satisfy the winning criterion for TOM(Σ, n + t, m).
X-Test Based on whether it’s an EPR or a Rigidity Round:
EPR (i) Choose W ∈ Σm uniformly at random among all strings satisfying: Wi = Z for all i ∈ N;
Wi = Z for all i ∈ T0; and Wi ∈ {X, Y} for all i ∈ T1. Send W to PV and receive
measurement results~e ∈ {0, 1}m . Let (~a,~b) = (~eN , 0n).
(ii) Apply update rules from Table 2 gate-by-gate to obtain ∀i ∈ [t] the X key before the i-th
T gate is applied, a′i, and the final X key for the output wire, a
′
f . If ∃i s.t. the i-th T gate is
even and ci 6= a′i + ei, reject. If c f + a′f 6= 0, reject.
Rigidity (Clifford) Choose W according to the marginal conditioned on W ′, µ(·|W ′). Send W to
PV and receive~e ∈ {0, 1}m . Reject if (W ′,~e′, W,~e) doesn’t win RIGID(Σ, m).
Z-Test Based on whether it’s an EPR or a Rigidity Round:
EPR (i) Choose W ∈ Σm uniformly at random among all strings satisfying: Wi = X for all i ∈ N;
Wi ∈ {X, Y} for all i ∈ T0; and Wi = Z for all i ∈ T1. Send W to PV and receive
measurement results~e ∈ {0, 1}m . Let (~a,~b) = (0n,~eN).
(ii) Apply update rules from Table 2 gate-by-gate to obtain ∀i ∈ [t], the X key before the i-th
T gate is applied, a′i. If ∃i s.t. the i-th T gate is odd and ci 6= a′i + ei, reject.
Rigidity (Clifford) Identical to X-Test case.
Figure 15: The Dog-Walker Protocol: Verifier’s point of view.
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1. If PP receives a question W ′ from V (he is playing TOM or RIGID):
Measure the m qubits in the observable indicated by W ′ — for example, if W ′ ∈ Σm, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, measure the i-th qubit in the basis indicated by W ′i — and report the outcomes
~e′ to V.
2. If PP receives~z, and sets N, T0 and T1 from V (he is playing the role of PEPR from the EPR Protocol):
Run the prover PEPR from Figure 3c on input~z, the n qubits in N, and the t qubits in T
0 ∪ T1.
Report the outputs~c ∈ {0, 1}t and c f ∈ {0, 1} of PEPR to V.
Figure 16: The Dog-Walker Protocol: Honest strategy for PP.
1. If PV receives a question W from V (he is playing RIGID or an X- or Z-Test Round):
Measure the m qubits in the observable indicated by W — for example, if W ∈ Σm, for i ∈
{1, . . . , m}, measure the i-th qubit in the basis indicated by Wi — and report the outcomes~e to
V.
2. If PV receives ~x,~z,~c and sets N, T0 and T1 from V (he is playing TOM or a Computation Round):
Run the procedure V0EPR from Figure 3b on input ~x, ~c, ~z, the n qubits in N, and the t qubits in
T0 ∪ T1. Report the outputs ~d and~e of V0EPR to V.
Figure 17: The Dog-Walker Protocol: Honest strategy for PV.
5.2 Completeness
Lemma 21. Suppose V executes the Dog-Walker Protocol with parameters (p1, p2, p3, p4). There is a strat-
egy for the provers such that, on any input (Q, |~x〉) such that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≥ 23 , V accepts with probability
at least pcompl = p1(1− δc) + p2 + 23 p3 + p4, for some δc = e−Ω(n+t).
Proof. The provers PV and PP play the strategy described in Figures 17 and 16 respectively. In the Rigidity-
Tomography round, the verification performed by V amounts to playing TOM(Σ, n + t, m) with the provers
(with an extra constraint on the output W of PV that is always satisfied by the honest strategy). This game
has perfect completeness, which makes the V accept with probability 1 in the Rigidity-Tomography round.
In the Rigidity-Clifford round, V plays RIGID(Σ, m) with the provers. The game has completeness at least
1− δc for some δc = e−Ω(n+t), since m = Ω(n + t), therefore their success probability in this round is at
least 1− δc.
In the EPR round, the provers are exactly carrying out the EPR Protocol, with V using PV to run
VrEPR, and PP playing the role of PEPR. Thus, test rounds result in acceptance with probability 1, and the
computation round results in acceptance with probability ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2, by Theorem 2.
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5.3 Soundness
Figure 18 summarizes the high-level structure of the soundness analysis. Intuitively, our ultimate goal is
to argue that both provers either apply the correct operations in EPR-Computation rounds, or are rejected
with constant probability. This will be achieved by employing a form of “hybrid argument” whereby it is
argued that the provers, if they are not caught, must be using the honest strategies described in Figure 16
and Figure 17 in the different types of rounds considered in the protocol. Towards this, we divide the round
types into the following four scenarios:
1. Rigidity-Clifford: The round type is Rigidity and the sub-round type is either X-Test or Z-Test.
(When the provers are honest) PV behaves as in Item 1 of Figure 17, and PP behaves as in Item 1 of
Figure 16.
2. EPR-Test: The round type is EPR and the sub-round type is either X-Test or Z-Test. PV behaves as
in Item 1 of Figure 17, and PP behaves as in Item 2 of Figure 16.
3. EPR-Computation: The round type is EPR and the sub-round type is Computation. PV behaves as
in Item 2 of Figure 17, and PP behaves as in Item 2 of Figure 16.
4. Rigidity-Tomography: The round type is Rigidity and the sub-round type is Computation. PV
behaves as in Item 2 of Figure 17, and PP behaves as in Item 1 of Figure 16.
Examining Figure 15, we can see the following. In the Rigidity-Clifford scenario, the verifier is precisely
playing the game RIGID with the provers, as the provers receive questions W ′ and W distributed according to
µ(·, ·), the distribution of questions for RIGID(Σ, m); their answers are tested against the winning conditions
of RIGID(Σ, m). In the Rigidity-Tomography scenario, the verifier plays a variant of the game TOM with the
provers, in which PV’s choice of observable W is uniquely determined by his inputs ~x, ~c and ~z: it should
match the observable implemented by V0EPR on these inputs. In EPR rounds, PV plays the part of V
r
EPR
from the EPR Protocol, and PP play the part of PEPR. The EPR-Test scenario corresponds to X- and Z-tests
from the EPR Protocol, whereas the EPR-Computation scenario corresponds to computation rounds from
the EPR Protocol.
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Figure 18: Overview of the soundness of the Dog-Walker Protocol
The structure of the proof is as follows (see also Figure 18):
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(i) By the game RIGID, in the Rigidity-Clifford rounds, both PP and PV must be honest, or they would
lose the game.
(ii) Since PV can’t distinguish between Rigidity-Clifford and EPR-Test (both are Figure 17 Item 1 from
his perspective, and the input distributions, while not identical, are within constant total variation
distance), PV must be honest in the EPR-Test rounds, by (i).
(iii) Since PP can’t distinguish between Rigidity-Clifford and Rigidity-Tomography (both are Figure 16
Item 1 from his perspective), PP must be honest in the Rigidity-Tomography rounds, by (i).
(iv) Since PV is honest in EPR-Test rounds by (ii), PP must be honest in EPR-Test rounds or he will get
caught, but in particular, he must output values {ci}i∈[t] that are uniform random and independent of
~z. Since PP can’t distinguish between EPR-Test and EPR-Computation rounds, this is also true in
EPR-Computation rounds, when the verifier sends the values {ci}i to PV.
(v) PV must be honest in Rigidity-Tomography rounds, or the provers would lose the game TOM.
(vi) Since PV can’t distinguish between Rigidity-Tomography rounds and EPR-Computation rounds (both
are Figure 17 Item 2 from his perspective), PV must be honest in EPR-Computation rounds, by (v),
and his input distribution to both rounds is within constant total variation distance, by (iv).
(vii) Since PV is honest in EPR-Test rounds by (ii), and EPR-Computation rounds by (vi), the combined
behavior of V and PV in the EPR rounds is that of VEPR in the EPR Protocol, so by the soundness
of the EPR Protocol, PP must be honest in EPR-Computation rounds, or get caught in the EPR-Test
rounds with high probability.
The following lemma establishes (i), (ii) and (iii).
Lemma 22. Suppose the verifier executes the Dog-Walker Protocol with provers (PV∗, PP∗) such that the
provers are accepted with probability q1 ≥ 1− ε in the Rigidity-Clifford Round, q2 in the EPR-Test Round,
q3 in the EPR-Computation Round, and q4 in the Rigidity-Tomography Round. Then there exist provers
(PV′, PP′) such that:
• PV′ and PP′ both apply the honest strategy in the Rigidity-Clifford rounds, PV′ applies the honest
strategy in the EPR-Test rounds, and PP′ applies the honest strategy in the Rigidity-Tomography
rounds; in particular, the state shared by the provers at the beginning of the protocol is a tensor
product of the honest state consisting of m shared EPR pairs and an arbitrary shared ancilla;
• The provers are accepted with probability q′2 = q2 −O(poly(ε)) in the EPR-Test Round, q′3 = q3 in
the EPR-Computation Round, and q′4 = q4 −O(poly(ε)) in the Rigidity-Tomography Round.
Proof. Using a similar argument as in Lemma 17, the strategy of PV∗ in Rigidity-Clifford rounds, which is
also his strategy in EPR-Test rounds (Figure 17 Item 1); and the strategy of PP∗ in Rigidity-Clifford rounds,
which is also his strategy in Rigidity-Tomography rounds (Figure 16 Item 1); can both be replaced with the
honest strategies. Since the distribution of inputs to PP∗ in the Rigidity-Tomography rounds and Rigidity-
Clifford rounds is the same, the success probability in the Rigidity-Tomography rounds is changed by at
most O(poly(ε)) by using the honest strategy. On the other hand, PV∗’s input distribution in EPR-Test
rounds is uniform on Σm, whereas his distribution in Rigidity-Clifford rounds is given by µ. However, from
the description of the test RIGID it is clear that for all W ∈ Σm, µ(W) ≥ 1
c|Σ|m for some constant c > 1,
thus the total variation distance between the two distributions is at most 1− 1c . Thus, replacing PV∗ with
the honest strategy in the EPR-Test rounds will change the success probability by at most O(poly(ε)).
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Finally, since the provers’ strategy in the EPR-Computation round has not changed, the acceptance
probability in it remains unchanged.
Next, we will show that whenever PV∗ is honest in the EPR-Test rounds this forces PP∗ to output (close
to) uniformly random {ci}i∈[t] that are independent of the round type, even given ~z. This will allow us to
verify that PP∗ is unable to signal to PV∗ whether the round is an EPR Round in the EPR-Computation
round, when PV∗ is sent~z and~c. This establishes (iv).
Lemma 23. Suppose the verifier executes the Dog-Walker Protocol with provers (PV∗, PP∗) such that the
initial shared state of the provers consists of m shared EPR pairs, together with an arbitrary shared auxiliary
state; PV∗ plays the honest strategy in the EPR-Test rounds; the provers are accepted with probability q1
in the Rigidity-Clifford Round, q2 = 1 − ε′ in the EPR-Test Round, q3 in the EPR-Computation Round,
and q4 in the Rigidity-Tomography Round. Then the input (~c,~z) given by the verifier to PV
∗ in the EPR-
Computation rounds has a distribution that is within O(ε′) total variation distance of uniform on {0, 1}t ×
{0, 1}t .
Proof. Let a′i denote the X key of the wire to which the i-th T gate is applied, just before the i-th T gate
is applied, and let Di be a random variable defined as follows. If the i-th T gate is even, let Di = ei + a
′
i,
where we interpret ei and a
′
i as the random variables representing the measurement result and key V would
get if she chooses to execute an X-Test round. If the i-th T gate is odd, let Di = ei + a
′
i, where we interpret
ei and a
′
i as the measurement result and key V would get if she chooses to execute an Z-Test round. Since
PV∗ is assumed to play honestly in EPR-Test rounds, ~D is uniformly distributed in {0, 1}t . In particular,
we have, for any ~d,~z ∈ {0, 1}t ,
Pr[~D = ~d, ~Z = ~z] =
1
4t
. (27)
Let Ci be the random variable that corresponds to the measurement output of the i-th T gadget by PP
∗
in X-Test round if the i-th T gate is even, or the measurement output of the i-th T gadget by PP∗ in Z-Test
round if the i-th T gate is odd.
Let T0 ⊂ [t] be the set of even T gates and T1 ⊂ [t] the set of odd T gates. In an X-Test Round, the
provers are rejected whenever i ∈ T0 and ci 6= di, and in a Z-Test Round, they are rejected whenever i ∈ T1
and ci 6= di. An EPR-Test Round consists of running one of these two rounds with equal probability, so:
Pr[~C 6= ~D] ≤ 2ε′. (28)
We can express (28) as
Pr[(~C, ~Z) 6= (~D, ~Z)] ≤ 2ε′.
We conclude by using the easily verifiable fact that for any random variables X and Y such that Pr[X =
Y] ≥ 1− 2ε′, the total variation distance between the marginal distributions on X and Y is at most 2ε′.
Next, we can use the tomography test TOM to establish (v), and then the fact that by Lemma 23 the input
to PV is not very different in EPR-Computation and Rigidity-Tomography rounds to establish (vi):
Lemma 24. Suppose the verifier executes the Dog-Walker Protocol with provers (PV∗, PP∗) such that: PV∗
applies the honest strategy in EPR-Test rounds; PP∗ applies the honest strategy in the Rigidity-Tomography
rounds; and the provers are accepted with probability q1 in the Rigidity-Clifford Round, q2 = 1− ε′ in the
EPR-Test Round, q3 in the EPR-Computation Round, and q4 = 1− ε in the Rigidity-Tomography Round.
Then there exist provers (PV′, PP′) such that PV′ applies the honest strategy in the Rigidity-Tomography
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rounds and EPR-Computation rounds, PP′ applies the honest strategy in Rigidity-Tomography rounds, and
the provers are accepted with probability q1 in the Rigidity-Clifford Round, q2 = 1 − ε′ in the EPR-Test
Round and q3 − poly(ε)−O(ε′) in the EPR-Computation round.
Proof. The Rigidity-Tomography rounds can be seen as V playing the Tomography Game with the provers,
except that whereas PV∗ gets no non-trivial input in the Tomography Game, in the Rigidity-Tomography
round, he gets random values ~c and ~z on which his strategy can depend. Fix ~x, and let {Qu
~c,~z}u be the
projective measurement that PV∗ applies upon receiving ~c,~z,~x, where u = (~d,~e) is the string of outcomes
obtained by PV on the n + t single-qubit measurements he is to perform according to Step 2 in Figure 17.
By Corollary 13, since the provers win the Rigidity-Tomography round with probability 1− ε, for every
~c,~z ∈ {0, 1}t , there exist distributions q~c,~z on Σm × {±} such that the following is O(poly(ε)):
E
~c,~z
∑
u∈{0,1}m
∥∥∥Tr
A,Bˆ
(
(IdA⊗VBQu~c,~z)|ψ〉〈ψ|AB(IdA ⊗VBQu~c,~z)†
)
− ∑
λ∈{±}
q~c,~z(W
′,λ)
(
m⊗
i=1
σui
W ′i ,λ
2
)∥∥∥
1
.
(29)
Here we use the notation from Corollary 12 and 13. The string W ′ = W(~c,~z,~u) ∈ Σm is uniquely
determined by~c,~z, and the outcomes u reported by PV∗; indeed it is using this string that PV∗’s answers are
checked against the measurement outcomes obtained by PP∗, who by assumption applies the honest strategy.
For any fixed (W ′,λ) the distribution on outcomes u obtained in the “honest” strategy represented by the
right-hand side in (29) is uniform. Thus the outcomes u reported by PV∗ are within poly(ε) of uniform.
From this it follows that the joint distribution on transcripts (~c,~z, u, W ′ = W(~c,~z, u)) that results from an
interaction with PV∗ is within statistical distance poly(ε) of the distribution generated by an interaction
with the honest PV; furthermore, by (29) the resulting post-measurement states on PP∗ are also poly(ε)
close to the honest ones, on average over this distribution.
We can now consider two provers PV′ and PP′ who, in Rigidity-Tomography rounds, first apply the
isometries VA, VB from Corollary 13, then measure their auxiliary systems Aˆ and Bˆ using ∆Y, obtaining a
shared outcome λ ∈ {±}, and finally apply the honest strategy shown in Item 2 of Figure 17 (λ = +) or
its conjugate (λ = −). Furthermore, conjugating the honest strategy produces exactly the same statistics
as the honest strategy itself, so we may in fact assume that PV′ and PP′ both apply the honest strategy in
Rigidity-Tomography rounds.
A consequence of PV′ applying the honest strategy in Figure 17 Item 2 is that PV′ also plays the
honest strategy in EPR-Computation rounds. Since PV′ is still honest in the EPR-Test round and q2 =
1 − ε′, Lemma 23 implies that the distribution of the input to PV′ in EPR-Computation rounds is within
poly(ε) +O(ε′) total variation distance of his input in Rigidity-Tomography rounds, therefore the provers’
success probability in EPR-Computation rounds changes at most by poly(ε) +O(ε′).
Finally, we show that if PV is honest, PP must be honest in EPR computation rounds, or the acceptance
probability would be low, establishing (vii):
Lemma 25. Suppose V executes the Dog-Walker Protocol on an input (Q, |~x〉) such that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤
1/3, with provers (PV, PP) such that PV plays the honest strategy. Let q2 be the provers’ acceptance
probability in EPR-Test rounds. Then the verifier accepts with probability at most p1(1 − δc) + p2q2 +
p3(5/3− 4q2/3) + p4.
Proof. With probability p2 + p3, V executes an EPR round, in which case, she executes EPR-Computation
with probability
p3
p2+p3
and EPR-Test with probability
p2
p2+p3
. In the former case, since PV is honest, he is
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executing V0EPR. In fact, the behavior of an honest PV in the EPR-Test rounds is also that of V
r
EPR. Thus,
the combined behavior of V and PV is that of VEPR. Then the result follows from Theorem 3.
We can now combine Lemmas 22, 24, and 25 to get the main result of this section, the “soundness” part
of Theorem 20.
Lemma 26 (Constant soundness-completeness gap). There exist constants p1, p2, p3, p4 = 1− p1 − p2 −
p3 and ∆ > 0 such that if the verifier executes the Dog-Walker Protocol with parameters (p1, p2, p3, p4) on
input (Q, |~x〉) such that ‖Π0Q|~x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3, then any provers (PV∗, PP∗) are accepted with probability at
most psound = pcompl − ∆.
Proof. Suppose the provers PV∗ and PP∗ are such that the lowest acceptance probability in either the
Rigidity-Clifford round or the Rigidity-Tomography round is 1− ε, and they are accepted with probability
1− ε′ in the EPR-Test round, and with probability 1/3 + w in the Computation Round. Applying Lemma
22 and Lemma 24 in sequence, we deduce the existence of provers (PV′, PP′) for which
q′1 = 1−O(δc),
q′2 = 1− ε′ − poly(ε),
q′3 =
1
3
+ w− poly(ε)−O(ε′),
q′4 = 1,
where q′1, q
′
2, q
′
3 and q
′
4 are their success probabilities in the four types of rounds, and 1− δc is the complete-
ness of the RIGID test; from Corollary 12 we have δc = 2−Ω(n+t). Moreover PV′ applies the honest strategy
in all rounds, while PP′ applies the honest strategy in the Rigidity-Clifford and Rigidity-Tomography rounds.
Applying Lemma 25, it follows that
w ≤ O(ε′) + poly(ε) + p1 ·O(δc).
Therefore the prover’s overall success probability is at most
min(p1, p4)(1− ε) + max(p1, p4) + p2(1− ε′) + p3
(
1
3
+ w
)
≤pcompl −
( p3
3
+ ε′p2 + εmin(p1, p4)
)
+ p3
(
O(ε′) + poly(ε)
)
+ (p1 + p3 p1) ·O(δc),
where recall from Lemma 21 that pcompl = p1(1− δc) + p2 + p4 + 23 p3. Fixing p2 to be a large enough
multiple of p1 and of p3 we can ensure that the net contribution of the terms involving ε
′ and δc on the
right-hand side is always non-positive. Choosing p1 = p4 and p3 so that the ratio p3/p1 is small enough
we can ensure that the right-hand side is less than pcompl − ∆, for some universal constant ∆ > 0 and all
ε, ε′ ≥ 0.
5.4 Two-prover game for QMA
In this section we propose a new two-prover game for QMA, which is based on the Dog-Walker protocol.
Such type of games are important in the context of the Quantum PCP conjecture [AAV13], more specifically
to its game version that was recently proved [NV18].
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A promise problem L is in QMA if there is a uniform family of quantum circuits {Vx}x∈L such that
if x is a yes-instance, then there exists a quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗nw , such that Vx accepts on input
|ψ〉|0〉⊗na with probability at least 23 , while for a no-instance x and all states |ψ〉 ∈
(
C2
)⊗nw
, Vx rejects
on input |ψ〉|0〉⊗na with probability at least 23 . The run-time of the circuit Vx and the values nw and na are
polynomially bounded in |x|.
In a multi-prover game for a promise problem L, an instance x ∈ L is reduced to a game Gx such that
if x is a yes-instance, then the maximum acceptance probability in the game is at least c, whereas if x is a
no-instance, then the maximum acceptance probability in the game is at most s, for c > s.
Here, we are interested in multi-prover games where the verifier is classical, the honest provers run
a polynomially bounded quantum computation on copies of an accepting witness and the completeness-
soundness gap c − s is constant. Using the Dog-Walker protocol, we are able to construct, to the best of
our knowledge, the first two-prover game for QMA with these parameters. In our protocol the Verifier and
provers exchange messages of polynomial size in two rounds of communication, one with each prover.
Our protocol consists in the Verifier running the Dog-Walker protocol, with the following changes:
• On X-Test rounds (resp. Z Test-rounds), the Verifier randomly selects positions where PV has mea-
sured in the Z basis (resp. X basis) and sends them to PP. PP uses the EPR pair halves in these
positions as the witness register when he executes the circuit Vx.
• On Rigidity-Computation rounds, the Verifier informs PV of the halves of EPR pairs that should
be used to teleport the witness state to PP, and PV reports the outcomes of the teleportation mea-
surements along with the answers for the original Dog-Walker protocol. The Verifier ignores the
measurements corresponding to the teleportation and uses the remaining bits to perform the same
checks as in the original Dog-Walker protocol.
• On EPR-Computation rounds, the Verifier informs PP of the EPR pair halves that should be used as
the witness when he performs the circuit Vx. The Verifier also informs PV of these positions, who
should use them to teleport the witness state to PP. The outcomes of the teleportation measurements
are reported to the Verifier along with the answers for the original Dog-Walker protocol, in order that
the Verifier can decrypt the output of the computation.
The full description of the protocol is presented in Figures 19, 20 and 21, where the differences to the
original Dog-Walker protocol are underlined. We state the result and sketch its proof.
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Let x be an instance of a language L ∈ QMA and Vx the associated verification circuit. Vx takes as input an
nw-qubit witness register and an na-qubit ancilla register. It has t T gates, t0 of which are even and t− t0
are odd (see Section 2.3 for the definition of even and odd T gates).
1. Select a round type EPR or Rigidity, and disjoint sets Nw, Na, T0, T1 ⊂ {1, . . . , m} of sizes nw, na, t0
and t− t0 respectively.
EPR Choose ~z uniformly at random from {0, 1}t and send it, along with ~x, Nw, Na, T0 and T1, to PP.
Receive measurement outcomes~c ∈ {0, 1}t and c f ∈ {0, 1} from PP.
Rigidity Choose W ′ according to µ(·) and send it to PP. Receive~e′ ∈ {0, 1}m from PP.
2. Select a sub-round type at random from Computation, X-Test or Z-Test.
Computation Based on whether it’s an EPR or a Rigidity Round:
EPR (i) Send ~x, ~z, ~c and sets Nw, Na, T0 and T1 to PV, and receive measurement outcomes
~a,~b ∈ {0, 1}nw+na and~e ∈ {0, 1}t .
(ii) Apply the update rules from Table 2 gate-by-gate to obtain the final X key for the output
wire a′f . If c f + a
′
f 6= 0, reject.
Rigidity (Tomography) (i) Choose uniform random strings ~c,~z ∈ {0, 1}t , ~x ∈ {0, 1}n to send to
PV, along with Nw, Na and T, and receive measurement outcomes~a,~b ∈ {0, 1}nw+na and
~e ∈ {0, 1}t .
(ii) From ~x,~c,~z,~a,~b and~e, determine the adaptive measurements W ∈ Σn+t that V0EPR would
have performed (based on Figure 3b), and reject if the input-output pairs (W ′,~e′) and (N ∪
T, (W,~e)) do not satisfy the winning criterion for TOM(Σ, n + t, m).
X-Test Based on whether it’s an EPR or a Rigidity Round:
EPR (i) Choose W ∈ Σm uniformly at random among all strings satisfying: Wi = Z for all
i ∈ Nw ∪ Na; Wi = Z for all i ∈ T0; and Wi ∈ {X, Y} for all i ∈ T1. Send W to PV and
receive measurement results~e ∈ {0, 1}m. Let (~a,~b) = (~eN , 0n).
(ii) Apply update rules from Table 2 gate-by-gate to obtain ∀i ∈ [t] the X key before the i-th
T gate is applied, a′i, and the final X key for the output wire, a
′
f . If ∃i s.t. the i-th T gate is
even and ci 6= a′i + ei, reject. If c f + a′f 6= 0, reject.
Rigidity (Clifford) Choose W according to the marginal conditioned on W ′, µ(·|W ′). Send W to
PV and receive~e ∈ {0, 1}m . Reject if (W ′,~e′, W,~e) doesn’t win RIGID(Σ, m).
Z-Test Based on whether it’s an EPR or a Rigidity Round:
EPR (i) Choose W ∈ Σm uniformly at random among all strings satisfying: Wi = X for all
i ∈ Nw ∪ Na; Wi ∈ {X, Y} for all i ∈ T0; and Wi = Z for all i ∈ T1. Send W to PV and
receive measurement results~e ∈ {0, 1}m. Let (~a,~b) = (0n,~eN).
(ii) Apply update rules from Table 2 gate-by-gate to obtain ∀i ∈ [t], the X key before the i-th
T gate is applied, a′i. If ∃i s.t. the i-th T gate is odd and ci 6= a′i + ei, reject.
Rigidity (Clifford) Identical to X-Test case.
Figure 19: QMA Protocol: Verifier’s point of view.50
1. If PP receives a question W ′ from V (he is playing TOM or RIGID):
Measure the m qubits in the observable indicated by W ′ — for example, if W ′ ∈ Σm, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, measure the i-th qubit in the basis indicated by W ′i — and report the outcomes
~e′ to V.
2. If PP receives ~x,~z, and sets Nw,Na, T0 and T1 from V (he is playing the role of PEPR from the EPR
Protocol):
Run prover PEPR from Figure 3c with the Vx as the circuit Q, on input~z, the nw qubits in N
w as
the witness, the na qubits in N
a as the ancilla, and the t qubits in T0 ∪ T1 for T gadgets. Report
the outputs~c ∈ {0, 1}t and c f ∈ {0, 1} of PEPR to V.
Figure 20: QMA Protocol: Honest strategy for PP.
1. If PV receives a question W from V (he is playing RIGID or an X- or Z-Test Round):
Measure the m qubits in the observable indicated by W — for example, if W ∈ Σm, for i ∈
{1, . . . , m}, measure the i-th qubit in the basis indicated by Wi — and report the outcomes~e to
V.
2. If PV receives ~x, ~z, ~c and sets Nw, Na, T0 and T1 from V (he is playing TOM or a Computation
Round):
Using the EPR pairs in Nw, teleports the witness state |ψ〉 that makes Vx accept with high
probability. Let (~aNw ,~bNw) be the corresponding outcomes of the teleportation measurements.
Measure each qubit in Na in the Z basis with outcomes ~d and let (~aNa ,~bNa) = (~d,~0)
Run the second step of procedure V0EPR from Figure 3b with Vx as the circuit Q, and the values
~c, ~z, the nw qubits in N
w as the witness, the na qubits in N
a as the ancilla, and the t qubits in
T0 ∪ T1 for T gadgets. Report the outputs~a,~b and~e of V0EPR to V.
Figure 21: QMA Protocol: Honest strategy for PV.
Lemma 27. There exists universal constants 0 ≤ pcompl ≤ 1 and ∆ > 0 such that the following holds.
Let L be a language in QMA and x an instance of L such that n = |x|. Let Vx be the verification circuit
for this instance and g the number of gates in Vx (in the compiled form as described in Section 2). Then
there exists a two-round interactive protocol between a classical verifier and two entangled provers where
the Verifier sends O(n + g)-bit questions to the provers, the provers answer with O(n + g) bits and the
protocol satisfies the following properties.
Completeness: If x is a yes-instance, then there is a strategy for the provers such that the Verifier accepts
with probability at least pcompl.
Soundness: If x is a no-instance, then for all strategies of the provers, the Verifier accepts with probability
at most psound = pcompl − ∆.
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Proof sketch. The Verifier performs the operations described in Figure 19.
The completeness of the protocol is straightforward: if PP and PV use the strategy in Figures 20 and
21, respectively, then the Verifier accepts with high probability.
The soundness of the protocol follows from the combination of the soundness of the Dog-Walker pro-
tocol and the soundness of the QMA verification circuit. Along the same lines as Lemmas 22, 23 and 24,
we can show that if the acceptance probability in Rigidity-Test, Rigidity-Computation and EPR-Test rounds
is sufficiently high, then there is a strategy where the provers follow the honest strategy and the acceptance
probability in EPR-Computation round is only slightly changed. In the case where the provers are honest in
the Rigidity-Test, Rigidity-Computation and EPR-Test rounds, no matter which state is held by PP as wit-
ness state, Vx rejects with high probability in the EPR-Computation round, by the soundness of the QMA
verification circuit. The proof of soundness can be completed by repeating the arguments in Lemma 26.
6 Running our protocols in sequence
In order to make a fair comparison between previous delegated computation protocols and ours (see Fig-
ure 1) we analyzed their resource requirements under the condition that they produce the correct outcome
of the computation with 99% probability. For most protocols, this is achieved by sequentially repeating the
original version, in order to amplify the completeness-soundness gap.
In this section, we describe a sequential procedure that, starting from our protocols in Sections 4 and 5,
ensures that either the verifier aborts, or she obtains the correct outcome of the computation with probability
99%. Moreover, for honest provers, the probability that the procedure aborts is exponentially small in the
number of sequential repetitions. Our sequential procedure has a number of rounds which depends on
the desired soundness. As long as one only requires amplification of an arbitrarily small, but constant,
soundness, to a fixed constant, the number of sequential repetitions remains constant.
To emphasize the importance of having such a sequential procedure, we note that, firstly, the current
completeness-soundness gap between acceptance probability on yes and no instances, for both the leash
and the Dog-Walker protocol, is a very small constant. Secondly, if a classical client wishes to employ our
protocols to delegate a computation, we need to specify what the client interprets, at the end of the protocol,
as the outcome of the delegated computation. The natural approach is to have the verifier interpret accept as
a yes outcome and reject as a no outcome. However, this is not enough, as our security model based on the
constant gap between acceptance probability for yes and no instances means that, while the provers have a
low probability of making the verifier accept a no instance as a yes, they can always make the verifier accept
a yes instance as a no, simply by behaving so that they are rejected.
The first point is addressed by running copies of the original protocol in sequence to amplify the
completeness-soundness gap. The second point is addressed by having the verifier run the protocol twice:
once for the circuit Q, and once for the circuit Q′ defined by appending an X gate to the output wire of Q.
If f : X → {0, 1} for some X ⊆ {0, 1}n is defined by f (x) = 1 if ‖Π0Q|x〉‖2 ≥ 2/3, and f (x) = 0 if
‖Π0Q|x〉‖2 ≤ 1/3, i.e. Q decides f with bounded error 1/3, then it is easy to see that Q′ decides 1− f
with bounded error 1/3. Thus, the verifier will accept x as a yes instance of f if the protocol outputs accept
when running Q on x and outputs reject when running Q′ on x. The verifier accepts x as a no instance of f
if the protocol outputs reject when running Q on x and outputs accept when running Q′ on x. The verifier
aborts if she sees accept-accept or reject-reject.
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6.1 Sequential version of our protocols
Let P denote either the Verifier-on-a-leash or the Dog-Walker protocol from Sections 4 and 5 respectively,
and let c and ∆ denote the completeness and completeness-soundness gap. Let κ be a security parameter.
Protocol Seq(P, c, ∆, κ): Let (Q, x) be the verifier’s input.
1. The verifier runs κ copies of protocol P in sequence on input (Q, x) with PP and PV. Then she runs
κ copies in sequence on input (Q′, x).
2. Let ~o,~˜o ∈ {0, 1}κ be such that oi = 1 iff the i-th copy on input (Q, x) accepts, and o˜i = 1 iff
the i-th copy on input (Q′, x) accepts. Let wt(~o) and wt(~˜o) be their Hamming weights. Then, the
verifier accepts 1 as the outcome of the delegated computation if wt(~o) ≥ (c− ∆2 ) · κ and wt(~˜o) <
(c− ∆2 ) · κ, and she accepts 0 as the outcome of the computation if wt(~o) < (c− ∆2 ) · κ and wt(~˜o) ≥
(c− ∆2 ) · κ. Otherwise the verifier aborts.
Figure 22: Sequential version of our protocols
We state and prove completeness and soundness for the sequential protocol.
Theorem 28. Let c and ∆ be respectively the completeness and completeness-soundness gap of protocol P.
On input (Q, x):
• If the provers are honest,
Pr
(
Seq(P, c, ∆, κ) outputs f (x)
) ≥ 1− 2 exp(−∆2κ
2
)
.
• For any cheating provers,
Pr
(
Seq(P, c, ∆, κ) outputs 1− f (x)) ≤ exp(−∆2κ
8
)
.
Proof. We first show completeness. Let s = c− ∆ be the soundness of protocol P. Suppose f (x) = 1 (the
case f (x) = 0 is analogous). If the provers are honest, then the probability that the verifier outputs 1 is:
Pr(Verifier outputs 1) = Pr
(
wt(~o) ≥
(
c− ∆
2
)
· κ ∧ wt(~˜o) <
(
c− ∆
2
)
· κ
)
≥ 1− Pr
(
wt(~o) <
(
c− ∆
2
)
· κ
)
− Pr
(
wt(~˜o) ≥
(
c− ∆
2
)
· κ
)
≥ 1− 2 exp
(
−∆
2κ
2
)
by Hoeffding’s inequality.
Next we show soundness. Again suppose f (x) = 1 (the case f (x) = 0 is analogous). Let Wj be an
indicator random variable for the event o˜j = 1, and let Fj = Wj − s. One might be tempted to immediately
assert that E(Fj|Fj−1, .., F1) ≤ 0. However, because of the sequentiality of the runs of protocol P, this is not
in general true, and an analysis that treats protocol P as a black-box does not suffice when P is the verifier-
on-a-leash protocol (because such a protocol is blind). We argue more precisely that E(Fj|Fj−1, .., F1) ≤ 0:
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• When P is the Dog-Walker protocol from section 5 (which is not blind): suppose for a contradiction
that there were provers PV and PP, and a j such that E(Fj|Fj−1, .., F1) ≤ 0. Then one can construct
provers PV′ and PP′ which break the soundness of protocol P. Namely PV′ and PP′ simulate j− 1
runs of protocol P. They then respectively invoke PV and PP and forward to them the transcripts
previously generated. PV′ and PP′ then participate in the challenge protocol P by forwarding all of
the incoming messages to the invocations of PV and PP respectively. By the initial hypothesis, such
PV′ and PP′ would break the soundness of P.
• When P is the Verifier-on-a-leash protocol from section 4: the key observation is that protocol P
remains sound even when x is revealed to the provers. Then, notice that if it is possible for provers
to force E(Fj|Fj−1, .., F1) ≤ 0 when x is not revealed, it is clearly also possible to do so when x is
revealed. However, the latter is not possible, by an analogous reduction to the one for the dog-walker
protocol.
Define Xl = ∑
l
j=1 Fj, for l = 1, .., κ. The sequence of Xl’s defines a super-martingale with |Xl − Xl−1| =
|Fl | ≤ 1 ∀j. Hence, by Azuma’s inequality, for any κ ≥ 1, Pr(Xκ ≥ t) ≤ exp(− t22κ ). This implies that
Pr
(
κ
∑
j=1
Wj − κ · s ≥ t
)
= Pr
(
κ
∑
j=1
Fj ≥ t
)
= Pr (Xκ ≥ t) ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2κ
)
.
Then, for any provers PP and PV,
Pr(Verifier outputs 0) ≤ Pr
(
wt(~˜o) ≥ (c− ∆
2
) · κ
)
= Pr
(
κ
∑
j=1
Wj ≥ (c− ∆
2
) · κ
)
= Pr
(
κ
∑
j=1
Wj − κ · s ≥ κ · ∆
2
)
≤ exp
(
−∆
2κ
8
)
.
Finally, one can check that when P is the verifier-on-a-leash protocol, then Seq(P, c, ∆, κ) remains blind.
This follows from a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 19.
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A Some simple tests
In this appendix we collect simple tests that will be used as building blocks. In Section A.1 and Section A.2
we review elementary tests whose analysis is either immediate or can be found in the literature. In Sec-
tion A.3 we formulate a simple test for measurements in the Bell basis and the associated two-qubit SWAP
observable. Finally, in Section A.4, we show how to extend the results from [NV17] to derive a robust
self-test for the m-qubit Pauli group.
A.1 The Magic Square game
We use the Magic Square game [Mer90] as a building block, noting that it provides a robust self-test test
for the two-qubit Weyl-Heisenberg group (see Section 2.1 for the definition). Questions in this game are
specified by a triple of labels corresponding to the same row or column from the square pictured in Figure 23
(so a typical question could be (IZ, XI, XZ); there are 6 questions in total, each a triple). An answer is
composed of three values in {±1}, one for each of the labels making up the question. Answers from the
prover should be entrywise consistent, and such that the product of the answers associated to any row or
column except the last should be +1; for the last column it should be −1. The labels indicate the “honest”
strategy for the game, which consists of each prover measuring two half-EPR pairs using the commuting
Pauli observables indicated by the labels of his question.
IZ ZI ZZ
XI IX XX
XZ ZX YY
Figure 23: Questions, and a strategy, for the Magic Square game
The following lemma states some properties of the Magic Square game, interpreted as a self-test (see
e.g. [WBMS16]).
Lemma 29. Suppose a strategy for the provers, using state |ψ〉 and observables W, succeeds with proba-
bility at least 1− ε in the Magic Square game. Then there exist isometries VD : HD → (C2 ⊗C2)D’ ⊗HDˆ,
for D ∈ {A, B} and a state |AUX〉
AˆBˆ
∈ H
Aˆ
⊗H
Bˆ
such that∥∥(VA ⊗VB)|ψ〉AB − |EPR〉⊗2A′B′ |AUX〉AˆBˆ∥∥2 = O(√ε),
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and for W ∈ {I, X, Z}2 ∪ {YY},∥∥(W −V†AσWVA)⊗ IdB |ψ〉∥∥2 = O(√ε).
A.2 Elementary tests
Figure 24 summarizes some elementary tests. For each test, “Inputs” refers to a subset of designated ques-
tions in the test; “Relation” indicates a relation that the test aims to certify (in the sense of Section 3.1);
“Test” describes the certification protocol. (Recall that all our protocols implicitly include a “consistency”
test in which a question is chosen uniformly at random from the marginal distribution and sent to both
provers, whose answers are accepted if and only if they are equal.)
Test ID(A, B):
• Inputs: A, B two observables on the same space H.
• Relation: A = B.
• Test: Send W ∈ {A, B} and W ′ ∈ {A, B}, chosen uniformly at random, to the first and second
prover respectively. Receive an answer in {±1} from each prover. Accept if and only if the answers
are equal whenever the questions are identical.
Test AC(X, Z):
• Inputs: X, Z two observables on the same space H.
• Relation: XZ = −ZX.
• Test: Execute the Magic Square game, using the label “X” for the “XI” query, and “Z” for the “ZI”
query.
Test COM(A, B):
• Inputs: A, B two observables on the same space H.
• Relation: AB = BA.
• Test: Send W ∈ {A, B} chosen uniformly at random to the first prover. Send (A, B) to the second
prover. Receive a bit c ∈ {±1} from the first prover, and two bits (a′, b′) ∈ {±1}2 from the second.
Accept if and only if c = a′ if W = A, and c = b′ if W = B.
Test PROD(A, B, C):
• Inputs: A, B and C three observables on the same space H.
• Relations: AB = BA = C.
• Test: Similar to the commutation game, but use C to label the question (A, B).
Figure 24: Some elementary tests.
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Lemma 30. Each of the tests described in Figure 24 is a robust (1, δ) self-test for the indicated relation(s),
for some δ = O(ε1/2).
Proof. The proof for each test is similar. As an example we give it for the commutation test COM(A, B).
First we verify completeness. Let A, B be two commuting observables on HA = HB = H, and
|EPR〉AB the maximally entangled state inHA ⊗HB. Upon receiving question A or B, the prover measures
the corresponding observable. If the question is (A, B), he jointly measures A and B. This strategy succeeds
with probability 1 in the test.
Next we establish soundness. Let |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB be a state shared by the provers, A, B their ob-
servables on questions A, B, and {Ca,b} the four-outcome PVM applied on question (A, B). Assume the
strategy succeeds with probability at least 1 − ε. Recall that this includes both the test described in Fig-
ure 24, and the automatic consistency test. Let CA = ∑a,b(−1)aCa,b and CB = ∑a,b(−1)bCa,b. Then CA
and CB commute. Thus
AABA ⊗ IdB ≈√ε AA ⊗ (CB)B
≈√ε IdA⊗(CB)B(CA)B
= IdA⊗(CA)B(CB)B
≈√ε BA ⊗ (CA)B
≈√ε BAAA ⊗ IdB .
Here each approximation uses the consistency condition provided by the test, as explained in (4). Thus
[A, B] = (AB− BA) ≈√ε 0, as desired.
We will often make use of the following simple lemma, which expresses an application of the above
tests.
Lemma 31. Let |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB and A, X observables on HA such that there exists an isometry HA ≃
C2 ⊗H
Aˆ
under which the following conditions hold, for some δ1, δ2, δ3:
9
(i) There exists an observable A′ on HB such that A⊗ Id ≈δ1 Id⊗A′;
(ii) |ψ〉 ≃δ1 |EPR〉|AUX〉 and X ≃δ1 σX ⊗ Id;
(iii) [A, X] ≈δ2 0;
(iv) {A, X} ≈δ3 0.
Then there exist Hermitian AI , AX, AY, AZ on HAˆ such that A ≃δ1+δ2 Id⊗AI + σX ⊗ AX and
A ≃δ1+δ3 σY ⊗ AY + σZ ⊗ AZ. (A similar claim holds with X replaced by Z.)
Proof. After application of the isometry, an arbitrary observable A˜ on C2 ⊗H
Aˆ
has a decomposition A˜ =
∑P∈{I,X,Y,Z} σP ⊗ AP, for Hermitian operators AP onHAˆ. We can compute
[A˜, σX ⊗ Id] = −2i σZ ⊗ AY + 2i σY ⊗ AZ, (30)
{A˜, σX ⊗ Id} = 2 σX ⊗ AI + 2 σI ⊗ AX. (31)
Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply [A, X] ≃δ1 [A˜, σX ⊗ Id], so by (iii) and (30) we get ‖AY|AUX〉‖2 +
‖AZ|AUX〉‖2 = O(δ1 + δ2). Similarly, (iv) and (31) give ‖AI |AUX〉‖2 + ‖AX|AUX〉‖2 = O(δ1 + δ3).
9Note that we allow either δi to equal 1, leading to a vacuous condition.
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A.3 The Bell basis
Given two commuting pairs of anti-commuting observables {X1, Z1} and {X2, Z2} we provide a test for a
four-outcome projective measurement in the Bell basis specified by these observables, i.e. the joint eigen-
basis of X1X2 and Z1Z2. The same test can be extended to test the “SW” observable,
SW =
1
2
(
Id+X1X2 + Z1Z2 − (X1Z1)(X2Z2)
)
, (32)
which exchanges the qubits specified by each pair of observables. The Bell measurement test described in
Figure 25 tests for both.
Test BELL(X1, X2, Z1, Z2):
• Inputs: For i ∈ {1, 2}, {Xi, Zi} observables, {Φab}a,b∈{0,1} a four-outcome projective measurement,
and SW an observable, all acting on the same space H.
• Relations: for all a, b ∈ {0, 1}, Φab = 14
(
Id+(−1)aZ1Z2
)(
Id+(−1)bX1X2
)
, and SW = Φ00 +
Φ01 + Φ10 −Φ11.
• Test: execute each of the following with equal probability:
(a) Execute the Magic Square game, labeling each entry of the square from Figure 23 (except entry
(3, 3), labeled as Y1Y2) using the observables X1, Z1 and X2, Z2.
(b) Send Φ to one prover and the labels (X1X2, Z1Z2, Y1Y2) associated with the third column of
the Magic Square to the other. The first prover replies with a, b ∈ {0, 1}, and the second
with c, d, e ∈ {±1}. The referee checks the provers’ answers for the obvious consistency
conditions. For example, if the first prover reports the outcome (0, 0), then the referee rejects if
(c, d) 6= (+1,+1).
(c) Send Φ to one prover and SW to the other. The first prover replies with a, b ∈ {0, 1}, and the
second with c ∈ {±1}. Accept if and only c = (−1)ab.
Figure 25: The Bell measurement test.
Lemma 32. The test BELL(X1, X2, Z1, Z2) is a robust (1, δ) self-test for
R =
{{
Φab
}
a,b∈{0,1} ∈ Proj, SW ∈ Obs
}
∪
{
Φab =
1
4
(
1 + (−1)aZ1Z2
)(
1 + (−1)bX1X2
)}
∪ {SW = Φ00 + Φ01 + Φ10 −Φ11},
for some δ(ε) = O(
√
ε).
Proof. Completeness is clear: the provers can play the honest strategy for the Magic Square game, use a
measurement in the Bell basis on their two qubits for Φ, and measure the observable in (32) for SW.
For soundness, let |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB, {W1W ′2 : W, W ′ ∈ {I, X, Z}}, {Φab} and SW denote a state and
operators for a strategy that succeeds with probability at least 1− ε in the test. From the analysis of the Magic
60
Square game (Lemma 29) it follows that the provers’ observables X1X2 and Z1Z2 associated to questions
with those labels approximately commute, and are each the product of two commuting observables X1 I,
IX2 and Z1 I, IZ2 respectively, such that X1 I and Z1 I, and IX2 and IZ2, anti-commute; all approximate
identities hold up to error O(
√
ε).
Since X1X2 and Z1Z2 appear together in the same question (the last column of the Magic Square, Fig-
ure 23), each prover has a four-outcome projective measurement {Wc,d}c,d∈{0,1} such that ∑d(−1)cWc,d =
X1X2 and ∑c(−1)dWc,d = Z1Z2, from which it follows that Wc,d = (1/4)(1 + (−1)cZ1Z2)(1 +
(−1)dX1X2).
The prover’s success probability in part (b) of the test is then
∑
a,b
〈ψ|Φab ⊗Wa,b|ψ〉 = ∑
a,b
〈ψ|Φab ⊗ 1
4
(
1 + (−1)aZ1Z2
)(
1 + (−1)bX1X2
)|ψ〉.
Using that, by assumption, {Φab} is a projective measurement, the condition that this expression be at least
1−O(ε) implies
Φab ⊗ Id ≈√ε Id⊗
1
4
(
1 + (−1)aZ1Z2
)(
1 + (−1)bX1X2
)
.
Combining this with the implicit consistency test yields the first relation. The last is guaranteed by part (c)
of the test, which checks for the correct relationship between SW and Φ; the analysis is similar.
A.4 The m-qubit Pauli group
In this section we formulate a robust self-test for the m-qubit Pauli group. The result is a slight extension of
the results from [NV17] to allow testing of σY observables.
A.4.1 The m-qubit Weyl-Heisenberg group
We start by giving a self-test for tensor products of σX and σZ observables acting on m qubits, i.e. the
m-qubit Weyl-Heisenberg group H(m) (see Section 2.1). Let P (m) denote the relations
P (m){X, Z} =
{
W(a) ∈ Obs, W ∈
m
∏
i=1
{Xi, Zi}, a ∈ {0, 1}m
}
∪
{
W(a)W ′(a′) = (−1)|{i: Wi 6=W ′i∧aia′i=1}|W ′(a′)W(a), ∀a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}m
}
∪
{
W(a)W(a′) = W(a + a′), ∀a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}m
}
.
Recall the notation W(a) for the string that is Wi when ai = 1 and I otherwise. The first set of relations
expresses the canonical anti-commutation relations. The second set of relations expresses the obvious rela-
tions σW Id = Id σW and σ
2
W = Id, for W ∈ {X, Z}, coordinate-wise. It is easy to verify that P (m) forms a
defining set of relations for H(m). Our choice of relations is suggested by the Pauli braiding test introduced
in [NV17], which shows that the relations are testable with a robustness parameter δ(ε) that is independent
of m. The underlying test is called the Pauli braiding test, and denoted PBT(X, Z). For convenience here
we use a slight variant of the test, which includes more questions; the test is summarized in Figure 26.
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Test PBT(X, Z):
• Inputs: (W, a), for W ∈ ∏ni=1{Xi, Zi} and a ∈ {0, 1}m.
• Relations: P (m){X, Z}.
• Test: Perform the following with probability 1/2 each:
(a) Select W, W ′ ∈ ∏i{Xi, Zi}, and a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}m , uniformly at random. If {i : Wi 6= W ′i ∧ ai =
a′i = 1} has even cardinality then execute test COM(W(a), W ′(a′)). Otherwise, execute test
AC(W(a), W ′(a′)).
(b) Select (a, a′) ∈ {0, 1}m and W ∈ ∏mi=1{Xi, Zi} uniformly at random. Execute test
PROD(W(a), W(a′), W(a + a′)).
Figure 26: The Pauli braiding test, PBT(X, Z).
The following lemma follows immediately from the definition of P (m){X, Z} and the analysis of the
tests COM, PROD and AC given in Section A.2.
Lemma 33 (Theorem 13 [NV17]). The test PBT(X, Z) is a robust (1, δ) self-test for P (m){X, Z}, for some
δ(ε) = O(ε1/2).
In addition we need the following lemma, which states that observables approximately satisfying the
relations P (m){X, Z} are close to operators which, up to a local isometry, behave exactly as a tensor product
of Pauli σX and σZ observables.
Lemma 34 (Theorem 14 [NV17]). The set of relations P (n) is δ-stable, with δ(ε) = O(ε).
Lemma 34 is proved in [NV17] with a polynomial dependence of δ on ε. The linear dependence can be
established by adapting the results of [GH17] to the present setting; we omit the details (see [Vid17]).
The following lemma is an extension of Lemma 31 to the case of multi-qubit Pauli observables; the
lemma avoids any dependence of the error on the number of qubits, as would follow from a sequential
application of Lemma 31.
Lemma 35. Let n be an integer, |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB and A and X(a), for a ∈ {0, 1}m , observables on HA
such that there exists an isometryHA ≃ (C2)⊗m⊗HAˆ under which the following conditions hold, for some
δ1, δ2, δ3:
(i) There exists an observable A′ on HB such that A⊗ Id ≈δ1 Id⊗A′;
(ii) |ψ〉 ≃δ1 |EPR〉⊗m|AUX〉, and X(a) ≃δ1 σX(a)⊗ Id;
(iii) [A, X(a)] ≃δ2 0;
(iv) For some c ∈ {0, 1}m and a · c = 1, {A, X(a)} ≃δ3 0;
where the first two conditions are meant on average over a uniformly random a ∈ {0, 1}m, and the last
over a uniformly random a such that a · c = 1. For some P ∈ {I, X, Y, Z}m let xP ∈ {0, 1}m be such that
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(xP)i = 1 if and only if Pi ∈ {Y, Z}. Then there exists Hermitian AP, for P ∈ {I, X, Y, Z}m, on HAˆ such
that
A ≃δ1+δ2 ∑
P∈{I,X}n
σP ⊗ AP, and A ≃δ1+δ3 ∑
P∈{I,X,Y,Z}m:
ci=1 =⇒ Pi∈{Y,Z}
ci=0 =⇒ Pi∈{I,X}
σP ⊗ AP.
(A similar claim holds with X replaced by Z.)
Proof. After application of the isometry, an arbitrary observable A˜ on (C2)⊗m ⊗H
Aˆ
has a decomposition
A˜ = ∑P∈{I,X,Y,Z}m σP ⊗ AP, for Hermitian operators AP onHAˆ. Then the analogue of (30) is
[A˜, σX(a)⊗ Id] = 2 ∑
P: a·xP=1
σPσX(a)⊗ AP.
Using that any string xP which is not the 0
m string satisfies a · xP = 1 with probability almost 1/2 for
a uniform choice of a, orthogonality of the σPσX(a) for distinct P lets us conclude the proof of the first
relation as in Lemma 31. Similarly, the analogue of (31) gives
{A˜, σX(a)⊗ Id} = 2 ∑
P: a·xP=0
σPσX(a)⊗ AP.
Using that any string xP which is not c satisfies a · xP = 0 with probability almost 1/2 for a uniform choice
of a such that a · c = 1, orthogonality of the σPσX(a) for distinct P lets us conclude the proof of the second
relation.
A.4.2 The m-qubit Pauli group
We will use an extended version of the Pauli braiding test introduced in Section A.4.1 which allows to test
for a third observable, Yi, on each system. Ideally we would like to enforce the relation Yi =
√−1XiZi.
Unfortunately, the complex phase cannot be tested from classical correlations alone: complex conjugation
leaves correlations invariant, but does not correspond to a unitary change of basis (see [RUV12, Appendix
A] for a discussion of this issue).
We represent the “choice” of complex phase,
√−1 or its conjugate −√−1, by an observable ∆ that
the prover measures on a system that is in a tensor product with all other systems on which the prover acts.
Informally, the outcome obtained when measuring ∆ tells the prover to use Y = iXZ or Y = −iXZ.
We first introduce Y and test that the triple {X, Y, Z} pairwise anticommute at each site. This corre-
sponds to the following set of relations:
P (m){X, Y, Z} =
{
W(a) ∈ Obs, W ∈ {X, Y, Z}n, a ∈ {0, 1}n
}
∪
{
W(a)W ′(a′) = (−1)|{i: Wi 6=W ′i∧aia′i=1}|W ′(a′)W(a), ∀a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}n
}
∪
{
W(a)W(a′) = W(a + a′), ∀a, a′ ∈ {0, 1}n
}
.
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Test PBT(X, Y, Z):
• Inputs: W ∈ ∏mi=1{X, Y, Z}
• Relations: P (m){X, Y, Z}.
• Test: Perform the following with equal probability:
(a) Execute test PBT(Xm, Zm).
(b) Execute test PBT(Ym, Xm) or test PBT(Ym, Zm), chosen with probability 1/2 each.
(c) Select a random permutation σ ∈ Sm/2, and W ∈ {I, Y}m uniformly at random. Write
W = W1W2, where W1, W2 ∈ {I, Y}m/2. Let Wσ1 be the string W1 with its entries permuted
according to σ. Do the following with equal probability:
(i) Send one prover W1W
σ
1 and the other either W1W2 or W2W
σ
1 (chosen with probability 1/2),
and check consistency of the first or second half of the provers’ answer bits.
(ii) Send one prover W1W
σ
1 , and the other ∏i Φi,σ(i), where each Φi,σ(i) designates a measure-
ment in the Bell basis for the (i, m/2 + σ(i)) pair of qubits. The first prover replies with
a ∈ {±1}m, and the second with b ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}m/2 . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , m/2}
such that bi = 00, check that ai = am/2+σ(i).
(iii) Execute m/2 copies of test BELL (in parallel), for qubit pairs (i, m/2 + σ(i)), for i ∈
{1, . . . , m/2}.
Figure 27: The extended Pauli braiding test, PBT(X, Y, Z).
The test is described in Figure 27. It has three components. Part (a) of the test executes test PBT(Xm, Zm),
which gives us multi-qubit Pauli X and Z observales. Part (b) of the test introduces observables labeled Y(c),
and uses tests PBT(Ym, Xm) and PBT(Ym, Zm) to enforce appropriate anti-commutation relations with the
Pauli X and Z observables obtained in part (a). Using Lemma 35, this part of the test will establish that the
Y(c) observables approximately respect the same n-qubit tensor product structure as X(a) and Z(b).
Part (c) of the test is meant to control the “phase” ambiguity in the definition of Y(c) that remains
after the analysis of part (b). Indeed, from that part it will follow that Y(c) ≃ σY(c) ⊗ ∆(c), where
∆(c) is an arbitrary observable acting on the ancilla system produced by the isometry obtained in part
(a). We would like to impose ∆(c) ≈ ∆|c|Y for a fixed observable ∆Y which represents the irreducible
phase degree of freedom in the definition of Y, as discussed above. To obtain this, part (c) of the test
performs a form of SWAP test between different Y(c) observables, enforcing that e.g. Y(1, 0, 1) is consistent
with Y(0, 1, 1) after an appropriate Bell measurement has “connected” registers 1 and 2. The swapping
is defined using Pauli σX and σZ, which leave the ancilla register invariant; consistency will then imply
∆(1, 0, 1) ≈ ∆(0, 1, 1).
Lemma 36. Suppose |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB and W(a) ∈ Obs(HA), for W ∈ {X, Y, Z}m and a ∈ {0, 1}m,
specify a strategy for the players that has success probability at least 1− ε in the extended Pauli braiding
test PBT(X, Y, Z) described in Figure 27. Then there exist isometries VD : HD → ((C2)⊗m)D’ ⊗ HˆDˆ, for
D ∈ {A, B}, such that ∥∥(VA ⊗VB)|ψ〉AB − |EPR〉⊗nA′B′ |AUX〉AˆBˆ∥∥2 = O(√ε),
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and on expectation over W ∈ {X, Y, Z}m,
E
a∈{0,1}m
∥∥(W(a)−V†A(σW(a)⊗ΛW(a))VA)⊗ IdB |ψ〉∥∥2 = O(√ε), (33)
where ΛW(a) = ∏i Λ
ai
Wi
∈ Obs(H
Aˆ
) are observables with ∆X = ∆Z = Id and ∆Y an arbitrary observ-
able on Hˆ such that ∥∥∆Y ⊗ ∆Y|AUX〉 − |AUX〉∥∥2 = O(√ε).
Proof sketch. The existence of the isometries VA and VB follows from part (a) of the test and the combination
of Lemma 33 and Lemma 34; see e.g. [NV17] for an explicit construction. Under this isometry we have
X(a) ≃√ε σX(a) and Z(b) ≃√ε σZ(b), on average over a, b ∈ {0, 1}m . Applying the second part of
Lemma 35, the anti-commutation relations between Y(c) and X(a) and Z(b) verified in part (b) of the test
imply that under the same isometry,
Y(c) ≃ σY(c)⊗ ∆(c),
for some observable ∆(c) on H
Aˆ
. Using the linearity relations that are verified in the PBT test, we may in
addition express ∆(c) = ∏i ∆
ci
i for (perfectly) commuting observables ∆i. Using Claim 37 below, success
at least 1−O(ε) in part (c) of the test then implies that on average over a random permutation σ ∈ Sn/2,
E
σ
E
c∈{0,1}m/2
2−mTr
(
σY(c, c
σ)
) 〈AUX|( m/2∏
i=1
(
∆i∆m/2+σ(i)
)ci)|AUX〉 = 1−O(√ε), (34)
where we wrote (c, cσ) for the m-bit string (c1, . . . , cm/2, cσ(1), . . . , cσ(m/2)). Defining
∆Y = E
i∈{ m2 +1,...,m}
∆i
| Ei ∆i| , (35)
Eq. (34) readily implies that ∆(c) ≈√ε ∆|c|Y . In slightly more detail, we first observe that
E
c∈{0,1}m/2
∥∥∥(∆(c)− ( E
i∈{ m2 +1,...,m}
∆i
)|c|)|AUX〉∥∥∥2 (36)
≤ E
c
E
g:{1,..., m2 }→{ m2 +1,...,m}
∥∥(∆(c)−∏
i
∆
ci
g(i)
)
|AUX〉∥∥2. (37)
where the first inequality is by convexity, with the expectation taken over a random function g. We would
like to relate this last term to the expectation over a random permutation σ ∈ Sm/2. One way to do this is to
observe that with probability 1−O(1/m) over the choice of a uniformly random g it is possible to write
∏
i
∆
ci
g(i)
=
(
∏
i
∆
c′i
m/2+τ′(i)
)(
∏
i
∆
c′′i
m/2+τ′′(i)
)
,
where c′i + c
′′
i = ci for all i, τ
′, τ′′ are permutations such that m/2 + τ′(i) = g(i) if c′i = ci, and m/2 +
τ′′(i) = g(i) if c′′i = ci; this is possible because g might have two-element collisions, but is unlikely to
have any three-element collisions. Moreover, for uniformly random c and g we can ensure that the marginal
distribution on (c′, τ′) and (c′, τ′′) is uniform. This allows us to use (34) twice to bound the right-hand side
of (37) by O(
√
ε) (after having expanded the square). As a consequence, Ei ∆i is close to an observable,
and it is then routine to show that ∆Y defined in (35) satisfies ∆(c) ≈√ε ∆|c|Y , on average over a uniformly
random c.
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The last condition in the lemma follows from the consistency relations, which imply that X(a)⊗ X(a),
Z(b) ⊗ Z(b) and Y(c) ⊗ Y(c) all approximately stabilize |ψ〉; then ∆|a|Y ⊗ ∆|a|Y ≈ X(a)Z(a)Y(a) ⊗
X(a)Z(a)Y(a) also does.
Claim 37. Let A ∈ Obs(C2
A1
⊗ · · · ⊗C2
Ak
⊗H) and B ∈ Obs(C2
B1
⊗ · · · ⊗ C2
Bk
⊗H) be k-qubit observ-
ables acting on distinct registers Aj, Bj, as well as a common spaceH, and ΦA’B’ = ∏kj=1 |EPR〉〈EPR|A’j,B’j
the the projector on k EPR pairs across registers A’j and B’j. Then(⊗
j
〈EPR|AjA’j〈EPR|BjB’j ⊗ IdH
)((
AAH ⊗ IdB
)(
IdA ⊗BBH
)⊗ΦA’B’)(⊗
j
|EPR〉AjA’j |EPR〉BjB’j ⊗ IdH
)
=
1
22k
∑
i
Tr
(
AiBi
)
A′iB
′
i, (38)
where we write A = ∑i Ai ⊗ A′i and B = ∑i Bi ⊗ B′i, for Ai on HA, Bi on HB, and A′i, B′i on H.
Proof. We do the proof for k = 1, as the general case is similar. Using that for any operators XAB and YA’B’,
〈EPR|AA’〈EPR|BB’
(
XAB ⊗YA’B’
)|EPR〉AA’|EPR〉BB’ = 14Tr(XYT),
the left-hand side of (38) evaluates to
4−1TrAB
((
AAH ⊗ IdB
)(
IdA⊗BBH
)(
ΦT
A’B’
⊗ IdH
))
,
which using the same identity again gives the right-hand side of (38).
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